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Abstract 
Serbo-American Relations, 1903-1913 
by Jason C. Vuic 
Master of Arts in History 
University of Richmond 
May 1997 
Dr. John D. Treadway, Advisor 
Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have shown 
more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United States. 
Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles examine 
Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, from 1903 to 
1913. Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate 
account of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Therefore 
the following chapters explore Serbo-American affairs from the death of King 
Alexander I Obrenovic in June 1903, to the conclusion of the Second Balkan War 
(1913). Relying primarily upon American diplomatic dispatches, as well as upon 
Serbian commercial data, this thesis concludes that contact between the two 
countries was small (owing largely to America's traditional non-involvement in 
European affairs), yet grew in significance towards the end of the ten-year 
period. 
I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History. 
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L Introduction 
Of the available studies concerning pre-World War I Serbia, few have 
shown more than a passing interest in that country's relations with the United 
States. Indeed, no books have appeared on the subject, while only four articles 
examine Serbo-American affairs during the kingdom's most dynamic decade, that 
being from 1903 to 1913. 1 They include: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian 
Relations in 1903-1904," Danica Milic, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog 
svetskog rata," Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," and Dragan Zivojinovic, 
"Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Americkih Drfava do 1918. godine. "2 
Though each is in some way valuable, these works fail to give an adequate account 
of the relations existing between Serbia and the United States. Both Vucinich and 
Popovic concentrate on the Belgrade coup of 1903, while Milic utilizes economic 
1 A fifth scholar has written an overview of Serbo-American relations, though, 
inexplicably, he fails to include the years 1903-13. See Ranko Petkovic, Jedan vek odnosa 
Jugoslavije i SAD (Beograd: Vojnoizdavacki i Novinski Centar, 1992). 
2The above works are as follows: Wayne S. Vucinich, "American-Serbian Relations in 
1903-1904," Slavia 15 (August 1940): 3-9; Danica Milic, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog 
svetskog rata," /storijski Caso pis 28 ( 1981 ): 129-35; Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 
Jugoslovenska revija za Medunarodno pravo VIII ( 1961 ): 80-98; Dragan Zivojinovic, 
"Jugoslovenske zemlje u politici Sjedinjenih Americki Dr/,ava do 1918. godine," Zbornik Matice 
Srpske 29 (1984): 49-68. 
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records to paint a rather incomplete·picture of America's early interest in Serbia. 
Only Zivojinovic treats the subject accordingly, but even then in a too general, 
somewhat dismissive manner. In short, there exists a small yet important gap in 
Balkan historiography. Therefore the following chapters will explore Serbo-
American relations from the death of King Alexander I Obrenovic in 1903, to the 
conclusion of the Second Balkan War. The work as a whole, however, does not 
represent a quantitative and/or structural analysis of America's pre-war Balkan 
diplomacy. It is, rather, a chronological account of a short, though influential 
period of Serbian history, one seen through the unique perspective of American 
diplomatic observers. 
To be sure, Serbian sources form an important part of this narrative, but the 
diplomatic dispatches of various American functionaries are prominent for two 
reasons. First, they reveal the common, day-to-day conduct of Serbo-American 
relations, including consular affairs, inter-state commerce, and diplomatic 
dialogue. Second (and perhaps more importantly), they provide an impartial and 
altogether uncommon view of the most important events occurring in Serbia prior 
to World War I. Of particular interest are the dispatches of Minister John 8. 
Jackson ( 1903-04 ), as well as the wartime ( 1912-13) accounts of Belgrade Consul 
Maddin Summers. 
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Inasmuch as this work is devoted to a brief ten-year period, Serbia and the 
United States were in contact as early as 1867.3 Formal diplomatic intercourse, 
however, did not take place until late 1881, when American and Serbian 
representatives negotiated two separate agreements, one a treaty of commerce, the 
other a consular convention.4 The following year, both the American Senate and 
the Serbian skupstina consented to ratification, and on 14 July 1882, the 
agreements were signed by President Chester A. Arthur. The exchange of 
ratification took place just four months later, on 15 November 1882. 
The first American representative to present his credentials in Belgrade was 
Eugene Schuyler, a New York native who also was accredited to the courts of 
3 At this time de facto relations were established through the American consul at 
Bucharest, Louis Czapkay. In Czapkay's absence, a Serbian representative named Kosta 
Magazinovic was asked to oversee American interests. See Bogdan Popovic, "Pokusaj 
uspostavljanja americko-srpskih odnosa 1867," Prilozi za knjiievnost, jezik, istoriju, i fiJ/klor 28 
(1962): 49-57. See also Milan Bulajic, "Upostavljanje diplomatiskih odnosa izmedju KnjliZevine 
Srbije i Sjedinjenih Americkih Driava 188 l, 11 Zbornik istorijskog muzeja Srhije 19 (1982): 147-
187. 
4For the text of America's commercial and consular treaties with Serbia, see Department 
of State, "Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Serbia, 11 and 
"Convention between the United States of America and His Highness the Prince of Serbia, 
Defining the Rights, Immunities and Privileges of Consular Officers, 11 Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-19./9, ed. Charles I. Bevans, vol. 
12 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 1227-1237. On the Senate 
ratification, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the 
United States of America, vol. 23 (New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), 476-77. The 
commercial treaty of 1881 was retained by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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Greece and Romania. 5 As minister resident and consul-general, Schuyler took an 
active interest in Serbian affairs. From 1882 to 1884, he promoted Serbo-
American commerce, and during that time enlisted the support of an American 
entrepreneur named Edward M. Grant. Despite their disagreements, both Grant 
and Schuyler enhanced America's commercial links with Serbia. In 1884 for 
instance, American exports to Serbia were worth over 2.3 million dinars, the 
highest level reached throughout the kingdom's forty year existence. After the 
. death of Grant (as well as with the reappointment of Schuyler), trade between the 
two countries assumed an irregular, somewhat neglected status. 
The United States, it appears, was simply more interested in other areas of 
the globe. Central and South America, China and the Pacific region, all were new 
and promising grounds for expansion.6 Therefore by 1890 the United States had 
become an active participant in world affairs, yet it continued to view Europe as 
_ 
5Schuyler presented his credentials on 10 November 1882. See Department of State, 
PrinCipal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chief\· of Mission, 1778-1990 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 164-66. With regards to 
Schuyler and the advent of Serbo-American relations, see Milan BulajiC, 147-187, and Dragan 
2ivojinovic, "Uspostavljanje diplomatskih i trgovinskih odnosa izmedju SAD i Srbije 1878-
1881," Zbornik za Jstoriju 25 (1982): 31-50; Idem, Preg/ed, no. 216 ( 1982): 2-13. 
6Conceming America's foreign interests prior to World War I, see Walter LaFeber, The 
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 2, The American Search for Opportunity, 
1865-1913 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Lawrence E. Gelfand ed., Essays 
on the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 
1972). 
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both decadent and dangerous, "with its balance of power, its rivalries, ... [and] its 
constant threats of war."7 Serbia, by association, was no dit1erent, positioned as it 
was between the great eastern empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary. In 
addition, Serbia was relatively remote, and its commercial prospects had yet to be 
explored, let alone exploited. Few Americans travelled there, and even fewer 
wished to accept a diplomatic post in Belgrade. 
Between 1882 and 1903, no fewer than ten men were named the American 
chiefs-of-mission, though not one chose to reside in Serbia on a regular basis.8 
Both economic and political affairs thus were handled by lower officials, most 
often consuls or vice-consuls general, many of whom were not even American 
citizens.9 Until 1903, only a few chiefs-of-mission showed more than a passing 
interest in Serbia, John B. Jackson among them. 
7Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1956), 310. See also Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 2d 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 201-75. 
8Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States 
Chief5 of Mission, 1778-1990, 164-66. See also John D. Treadway, "Serbian-American 
Relations: the First Quarter Century," Paper presented at the Serbian Academy of Sciences, 
Belgrade, 25 March 1992, and Elmer Plischke, United States Diplomats and Their Missions: A 
Profile of American Diplomatic Emissaries since 1778 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975). 
9 As to the duties of consular officials, see Charles Stuart Kennedy, lhe American 
Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-191./ (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1990). See also Henry E. Maddox, The Twilight of Amateur Diplomacy (Kent, Ohio: Kent 
State University Press, 1989). 
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Appointed late in 1902, Jackson was an experienced foreign officer, who 
came to the Balkans after a similar assignment in Berlin. 10 As envoy extraordinary 
and minister plenipotentiary to the courts of Greece, Romania, and Serbia, Jackson 
was in a unique yet useful position when confronted with the peninsula's myriad 
entanglements. He could leave Serbia, tour neighboring kingdoms, 
and conduct other business in the region without disrupting diplomatic ties. 
This was especially helpful in moments of crisis, such as in June 1903, when a 
palace revolution resulted in the death of King Alexander I Obrenovic. The 
event marked a watershed in the history of modem Serbia, as Obrenovic, 
somewhat Austrian in his leanings, was succeeded by Peter I Karadjordjevic, 
a strict constitutionalist and supporter of Tsarist Russia. Over the next decade 
Serbia would realign itself, undoing a string of unpopular moves that had been 
initiated by its former monarch. According to one historian, in the years prior to 
1903, Obrenovic: 
carried out four state coups, abrogated three constitutions, and 
named and dismissed twelve cabinets as he gyrated between 
personal despotism and semi-constitutional rule.... In foreign affairs 
'
0A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Jackson entered the Foreign Service in 
December 1890. He spent the greater part of his career in the Balkans, subsequently serving as 
E.E. and M.P. to Montenegro and Bulgaria. In 1906, Jackson represented the United States at the 
Olympic games in Athens; in 1912 he was a special representative to the coming of age ceremony 
of Crown Prince Boris of Bulgaria. 
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Alexander zigzagged between Russia and Austria-Hungary until 
neither power believed nor supported him. Alexander concluded 
that he could do precisely as he wished without heeding objections 
or opposition. 11 
In July 1900, the young king announced his intention to marry Draga 
Masin, a widow ten years his senior. Those closest to him objected, citing the 
need of a foreign princess, or at least someone of less questionable repute. Interior 
Minister Djordje Gencic begged Alexander to reconsider, arguing "Sire, you 
cannot marry her. She has been everyone's mistress, including minc."12 
Undaunted, Alexander soon fell under the control of Draga, a beguiling, 
unscrupulous woman. Unable to prevent the marriage, the king's cabinet resigned 
amidst widespread indignation. Even Alexander's father, the ex-King Milan I 
Obrenovic, expressed regret, believing his son was "pushing Serbia into an 
abyss." 13 
llDavid MacKenzie, "A Military Coup Which Succeeded: Serbia May 29, 1903," Serbian 
Studies 6 (Fall 1991): 55. 
12Ibid., 56. 
13Quoted in Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia Befll'een h'ast and West: the Hvents of 1903-190X 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954 ), 9. Milan had renounced his throne in 1889 for the 
sum of two million dinars. 
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Eventually the marriage spawned a plot by the officers' corps to assassinate 
the couple, whom many viewed as an embarrassment to the Serbian nation. Blind 
with love, Alexander 
endeavored to transform Draga into a state cult. Regiments, 
schools, and villages were named after her. Her brothers and 
sisters were continually at the court and took part in formal 
audiences and receptions. The queen's birthday, September 11, 
was designated a state holiday. 14 
To make matters worse, Draga thrice feigned pregnancy in order to solidify her 
position as queen. When at last examined by foreign obstetricians, it was revealed 
the queen was not pregnant, and, as many feared, sterile. The public was outraged, 
and as a result, disaffection grew. 15 
By late 1901, the planned conspiracy had come to involve over 120 civilian 
and military officials. On two separate occasions they planned to remove the pair, 
though for various reasons, their efforts had come to naught. When in 1903 it was 
rumored that Draga's brother was to be named heir to the Serbian throne, a plan 
ulbid., 12. 
150ne of Jackson's predecessors, Charles S. Francis, stated in 190 l that "the present 
situation .. .in Servia is most serious and that the people, especially the commercial interests, 
regard with grave apprehension the future of the country." Despatches of the United States 
Ministers to Serbia, 5 July 1900 - 31 July 1903, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-630. 
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took shape. 16 Led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis, some twenty-eight army 
officers stormed the palace in the early morning hours of 11 June. After a frantic 
search they succeeded in killing both the king and queen, as well as a number of 
prominent figures. A provisional government quickly formed, and by 15 June, 
Serbia possessed a new king, Peter I Karadjordjevic. 
16Besides that of MacKenzie and Vucinich, a number of works in English examine the 
coup of 1903. See Chedomile Mijatovich, The Royal Tragedy: Reing the Story of the 
Assassination of King Alexander and Queen Drag a of Servi a (London: 1906), and Herbert 
Vivian, "A 'Glorious Revolution' in Servia," Fortnightly Review 79 (I July 1903): 67-75. 
IL From Coup to Coronation, 
1903-1904 
As for the United States, the coup of 11 June caught Minister Jackson 
completely unprepared. His first dispatch, sent nearly two days after the affair, 
came to the State Department via the American embassy in Vienna. The reason for 
this was that the regicides occurred when Jackson was between posts, travelling 
aboard a Greek steamer to Trieste. Instead of proceeding directly to Belgrade, 
Jackson stopped at the Austrian capital to wire Washington of his plans. "Unless 
otherwise instructed," he wrote, "I shall go to Belgrade Monday and enter into 
relations with the de facto Servian Government. ... Please send new credentials if 
[the] mission is to be continued."1 On 15 June he arrived in Serbia, the same day 
on which Peter was elected king by the Serbian skupstina. 
Jackson found Belgrade to be the most ambivalent of places, where the 
murders had failed to elicit even the smallest expressions of" either horror or 
regret. "2 He therefore felt that in Serbia there was "no such thing as public 
1Jackson to John Hay (Secretaty of State), Vienna, 13 June 1903, T-630. 
1Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630. 
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opinion, and to the masses the personality of the King, the nature of the 
Constitution, or the fact whether or not there is a constitution at all," was a matter 
of "absolutely no importance. "3 Though he spoke at length concerning the 
supposed apathy of the people, Jackson did not, however, offer a detailed account 
of the coup. He wrote that Belgrade was full of special correspondents, and that 
the story most likely had been reported in the American press. 
Indeed, several American newspapers devoted space to events of 11 June. 
Of these, the Pittsburgh Gazette and the Chicago Record-Herald were the most 
attentive, as each city possessed a rather large Serbian population. The Gazette 
claimed thunderously that the murders could "change the map of Europe," while m 
a similar manner the Record-Herald insisted they were among the most "notable 
assassinations in history."4 Both publications expected a civil war, but like the 
Washington Post, their editorials hoped the coup would not inspire "acts of 
[foreign] intervention."5 Few newspapers discussed the future of Serbo-American 
relations, though the New York Times proffered its own advice as to what path the 
tp;usburgh Gazette, 12 June 1903; Chicago Record-Herald, 12 June 1903. 
5Washington Post, 14 June 1903. Two days earlier, the /'o.\·r reported that "the Servians 
seem to be as proficient in rioting at home as they are in this country." 
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State Department should follow. If Peter chose to "scandalize mankind by 
rewarding the murderers," it stated that Jackson (as a three-way representative) 
should not break off relations, but "simply refrain from going there."<' The Sun of 
New York cautioned President Theodore Roosevelt that "in the present instance it 
would be the height of irony and in the poorest taste ... to telegraph the new King," 
especially since Peter had "attained the throne through an act of blood."7 Echoing 
The Sun, the Boston Daily Globe believed "it would not be proper to extend 
congratulations to the new king," but that "since the United States and Servia have 
never sustained close diplomatic relations" Roosevelt's position was "less 
embarrassing than it otherwise would be. "8 
The Chicago Chronicle insisted that though horrible indeed, the events in 
Serbia "would not have any important effect on the interests of the United States."9 
In like manner, The Cleveland Plain Dealer sardonically remarked that it doesn't 
6New York Times, 16 June 1903. 
7The Sun (New York), 12 June 1903. 
8Boston Daily Globe, 12 June 1903. The Globe stated on 13 June that the fate of Draga 
"should be a sad warning for American heiresses who aspire to get too near the throne. The 
bluest royal blood will brook no rivalry with the common herd, and the common people do not 
trust their own origin." 
9Chicago Chronicle, 12 June 1903. 
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seem to matter whether the ruling dynasty was "[one] vitch or 'tother."10 The 
Philadelphia Inquirer went a step further, maintaining that "the time has gone 
when the civilized world would be aroused even by minor disturbances in that 
section [of the world]." 11 
It appeared, however, that the Inquirer was far too presumptive, especially 
when the Great Powers were reacting with genuine, unabraded disgust. Their 
indignation only intensified when Peter forbade any arrests or condemnations, an 
understandable gesture considering that many of the conspirators held influential 
positions within his government. Nevertheless, Jackson and the rest of the 
Belgrade diplomatic corps continued to hope that "foreign comment ... [ would] 
ultimately be of some affect," and let it be known that they expected the dismissal 
of those involved. 12 On 19 June, Jackson wrote: 
Everything goes to show that the conspiracy was most carefully 
planned and admirably carried out in all its details. The 
provisional government assembled with suspicious promptness, 
and the various proclamations are of such a character as to lead 
one to believe that it had been prepared in advance .... Those 
10C/eveland Plain Dealer, 15 June l 903. 
11Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 June 1903. 
12Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 19 June 1903, T-630. The Belgrade diplomatic corps 
consisted of representatives from the following nations: the United States, Great Britain, Fram.:e, 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Bulgaria. 
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directly concerned with the attack ... are not at all ashamed, and 
officers implicated in it act as guides through the palace and give 
explanations with more or less evident pride. 13 
The new monarch spoke of the conspirators in "complimentary terms," and 
according to Jackson, both the National Assembly and the Metropolitan of 
Belgrade "either directly or indirectly expressed approval" with their work. 14 The 
conspirators also enjoyed a large measure of public sympathy, and were "extolled 
by the army and the people as liberators of the country." 15 
Nonetheless, Jackson understood that the Belgrade coup posed an enormous 
threat to the regime it had brought to power. Indeed, most of the diplomatic corps 
believed Peter to be a mere figurehead, devoid of authority, and wholly under the 
influence of the conspirators in question. Serbia's new foreign minister, Ljubomir 
Kaljevic, confided in Jackson that it "made little difference whether the new 
13Ibid. The provisional government consisted of ten members, four of which actively 
participated in the murder of Alexander. They included: Jovan Avakumovic (prime minister), 
General Jovan Atanackovic (minister of war), Djordje Gentic (minister of the finance), and 
Colonel Aleksa Masin (minister of public works). 
11Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 18 June 1903, T-630. 
15Quoted in David MacKenzie, Apis: the Congenial Compirator (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, I 989), 51. 
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king ... [was] a man of great capabilities or not," though he himself was a old 
Karadjordjevic supporter. 16 
On 19 June, Jackson informed Secretary of State John Hay that Russia was 
the first country to enter into relations with the Royal Government, though its 
minister, Nicholas Charykov, was urging the punishment of the conspirators. 
According to Charykov, Serbia was an independent nation, and to him, the 
conspiratorial question was solely of domestic concern. In the interest of "peace in 
the Balkans," he stated that "nothing should be done to weaken the authority of the 
new king." 17 Russia, however, supported Peter for a far less benevolent reason. 
The new monarch was a known Slavophile and proponent of Serb expansionism. 
It was quite possible that he would sever Serbia's unusually close ties with Austria-
Hungary, first initiated during the reign of Alexander's father, King Milan 
Obrenovic. Jackson informed Hay on 21 June: 
The general impression seems to be that Russia has gained a 
considerable advantage over Austria by her prompt recognition of 
King Peter...[Austria has] been more interested in maintaining good 
relations with the sovereign [Alexander I Obrenovic], while Russia 
has paid more attention to the Servian people. The sons of the new 
King are being educated in Russia, and his sympathies are supposed 
16Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630. 
17Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21 June 1903, T-630. 
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to be more with that country than they are with Servia's more 
immediate neighbor. 18 
Russia and Austria were, in fact, the only countries to be infonned officially of 
Peter's accession, leaving other diplomats unprepared for his 25 June arrival. 
Without personal letters of introduction (in Jackson's case, between Roosevelt and 
Peter,) protocol demanded that foreign envoys neither meet with nor recognize the 
new king. 
Jackson's position therefore was somewhat anomalous, and on 20 June he 
wrote that most of the other gentlemen "all had letters to the late King, and we 
should all need letters for his successor. "19 Secretary of State Hay responded 
promptly, instructing Jackson to remain relatively aloof, and to observe the actions 
of the other consuls. "If the diplomatic body [is] unanimous you may act with 
them," wrote Hay, "otherwise do not be in haste to enter into official relations. In 
view of the recent horrible crimes it might be as well for you to remain for a while 
18Ibid. For a general overview of Russian policies toward Serbia, see Barbara Jelavich, 
Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-191./ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
Also of interest is Charykov's own work, Glimpses of High Politics: Through War and Peace, 
1855-1929 (New York: Macmillan, 1931). 
19Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 20 June 1903, T-630. According to one scholar, Peter's 
regime appeared not to understand the accepted protocol, and in particular the need for formal 
letters of accession. See Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 93. 
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at one of your other posts."20 To ascertain what he called "a unifonn course of 
action," Jackson met with the representatives of some twelve countries the next 
morning.21 
At the Turkish legation the emissaries agreed to show proper respect to the 
new king, though none wished simply to ignore the regicides. Most would have 
been ready, however, "to recognize the new King if he had notified their 
sovereigns, instead of doing so only in the case of the Czar and the Emperor Franz 
Joseph."22 
Jackson himself believed that Russia was following the proper course, and 
if America had possessed any real interest in Serbia, he would have followed 
Charykov's example. Both Russia and Austria, he stated, "abhor the murder of 
King Alexander no less than does the rest of the civilized world, but nothing they 
can do will bring him back to life, and there would appear to be nothing which 
could be gained through failing to treat his successor with the customary respect. "2' 
To this he added: 
20Hay to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 20 June 1903, Diplomatic Instructions of the 
Department of State- the Balkan States, 1801-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-77. 
21Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21June1903, T-630. 
22lbid. 
23Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630. 
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King Peter was chosen in a constitutional manner, and so far as the 
Servian people can be said to have a will, it is the will of the 
people that he should reign over them. As an American 
republican, it seems to me proper that he should be recognized 
promptly.24 
Nevertheless, Jackson refused to act without diplomatic credentials, the lack of 
which forced him to leave Belgrade on 23 June. Accompanied by the Turkish 
minister, he departed on an evening train for Athens.25 
America's immediate interests in Serbia, such as they were, thus fell under 
the supervision of acting vice-consul Christian Vogeli, a Swiss citizen and 
representative of the New York Life Insurance Company. In the past Voge Ii had 
rendered much service to the Legation, but in Jackson's estimation, he frequently 
expressed a bias "too great...[for] political matters."26 His wife was a Serbian, and 
together they openly sympathized with Peter. To Jackson's chagrin, Vogeli draped 
his office with bunting and other decorations in honor of the new king, though at 
the entrance an American shield hung prominently. 
25For a brief survey of Jackson's activities in Athens, see Demetrios E. Peppas, "Relations 
Between the United States and Greece, 1878-1908," Bulkun Studies 9 (1968): 354-358. 
26Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630. 
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At the time, only one American was living in Serbia, Samuel Weiss, a 
Hungarian immigrant employed by Vogeli. Besides insurance, both Weiss and 
Vogeli concerned themselves with exports to the United States. According to 
Jackson they "averaged about six envoices a year, but there were practically no 
imports, such American articles as find their way into the country being brought 
from Austria. "27 
Year kg. 
1903 
1904 70 
Table 1 
Serbian Trade with the United States, 
1903-1904 
(in dinars) 
F,xports Imports 
value % kg value 
948,559 766,458 
1,000 863,111 745,274 
Source: Statistika spoljaJnje trgovine Kr. Srhije. 1903-190./. 
% 
132 
1.22 
Nevertheless, the Serb Ministry of Finance did keep a sufficient record of 
goods imported from the United States. Though nearly all passed through 
Austrian middlemen, in the decade prior to 1904, imports from the United States 
were a respectable 9,303,758 kg. According to the Serbian Ministry of Finance, 
their value came to just over 11.5 million dinars. To be sure, 1903 imports had 
271bid. 
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dropped to their lowest level in fifteen years (948,559 kg), but Serbia still managed 
to purchase some 530,000 kg of coffee, 308,000 kg of cooking and mineral oils, 
and 17,000 kg of machinery, all of which came from stateside producers. 
Conversely, Serbian exports to the United States were almost non-existent, the lack 
of a coastline, and inadequate transport treaties contributing to a low sea-faring 
trade. What Serbia could export (mostly dried fruits and other agricultural 
products), was sent to Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary, the latter claiming 
over 80 percent of its trade in 1903-04. 
To Jackson, the dearth of American commerce could be attributed to what 
he considered half-hearted diplomacy. The absence of permanent ministers in each 
of the Balkan capitals frequently resulted in missed opportunities, especially in 
Romania, where oil and grain exports were among Europe's largest.28 Jackson 
believed that under the circumstances it was impossible "to satisfy himself or any 
280n Jackson's attempts to improve American commerce with Romania see I. Stanciu, 
''Considerations sur I' evolution des rapports commerciaux entre la Roumanie et Jes Etats-Unis d' 
Ameriquejusqu' en 1914," Revue Roumaine d' Histoire 11 (1972): 622-625. For comparative 
studies of Romanian commerce see John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan h'conomic 
History, 1550-1950 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) and Ivan T. Berand and 
Gyorgy Rlinki, Economic Development in East-rentral Europe in the 19th & 20th Centuries 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 
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one else, or to do much of anything towards advancing American commercial 
interests. "29 
Jackson was not the only representative, however, to criticize American 
practices. By 1903, Serbia's prune export was the largest in the world, exceeding 
that of the United States by almost 13,000 tons. 30 Some twenty years earlier, vice-
consul Edward M. Grant had talked of "securing arrangements which [would] 
throw the entire prune trade of Serbia into American hands," but to do so he 
needed the "cooperation [of] the right kind of a House in the United States. "11 
Such cooperation was not forthcoming, nor was an increase in America's 
minuscule consular budget. In fact, both Grant and his successor Vogeli were 
"honorary" vice-consuls, a term applied to unpaid functionaries. 
Fortunately for Vogeli, his ultimate livelihood did not depend upon Serbian 
exports to the United States. He performed admirably as an agent of New York 
29Jackson to Hay, Athens, 29 June 1903, T-630. 
30Michael Palairet, "Merchant Enterprise and the Development of the Plum-Based Trades 
in Serbia, 1847-1911," Economic History Re1•iew 30 (November 1977): 583. From 1903-1907, 
Serbia exported some 35,400 tons per annum; the United States, 22,400 tons. Prior to 1900, 
Serbia also experienced two short lived export booms, first for silk in the 1860's, then for wine in 
the l 880's. Again see Michael Palairet, "Serbia's Role on International Markets for Silk and 
Wine, 1860-1890," Acta historico-oeconomica Iugos/aviae IV (1977): 161-86. 
31 Grant to John Davis (Assistant Secretary of State), Belgrade, 12 September 1884, 
Despatches from the United States Consuls in Belgrade, 1883-1906, National Archives, 
Microcopy No. T-513. 
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Life, and in 1903 could claim over 1, 100 Serbian clients, a number which would 
increase substantially in the coming decade.32 The company's success was due in 
large part to a lack of domestic providers, and for many years it would rank second 
or third among a host of European firms. All told, New York Life handled over 20 
percent of Serbia's life insurance policies from 1903 to 1904. 33 
On 8 July, Jackson informed Hay that most European sovereigns had been 
notified of Peter's succession, and that a number of ministers subsequently had 
returned to Belgrade. "All this goes to show," wrote Jackson, that "etiquette has as 
much to do as morality, with the action of the diplomatic corps in absenting itself 
from the reception of King Peter."3.i Jackson's dispatch prompted Second Assistant 
Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee to write, "If etiquette settles it, why should we 
not have a notification from Peter? Perhaps it will enable us to decide this knotty 
point. "35 In a note to Secretary Hay, Adee stated: 
32Danica Milic, "DomaCi i strani kapital u osiguranju (Srbija do 1914 ), " /storija XX veka 
XII (1972): 13-30. The New York Life Insurance Company established a Belgrade office in 
1887. 
33 Ibid. A rather humorous editorial appeared in the 15 June edition of the ChicawJ 
Record-Herald, stating: "After all, there is one advantage in being King of Servia. He isn't likely 
to be bothered much by insurance solicitors!" 
3~Jackson to Hay, Athens, 8 July 1903, T-630. 
35Adee to Francis B. Loomis (Assistant Secretary of State), Washington, D.C., 23 July 
1903, T-630. 
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There can be only two valid grounds for the non-recognition of 
King Peter. 1st, a conviction that he was accessory before the fact 
to the murder of the late King. 2nd, an opinion that the virtual 
reward of the murderers and their participation in the new govt. is 
immoral. I hardly know what right we have to sit in judgement on 
either of these charges.36 
Hay wrote in response, "I think your view of the situation is immensely correct-
but Peter is a little slow- we can afford to wait. "37 
On 18 July, Assistant Secretary Francis B. Loomis wired Jackson (who was 
now residing in Bucharest) that it was best not to travel to Belgrade at that time, 
and that before doing so he first should ascertain discreetly if Peter had sent a letter 
notifying the President of his accession. If this was not the case, wrote Loomis, 
Jackson was to be careful "not to invite such an action."'8 As of 23 July, Jackson 
had gathered no such information, and stated that he W'1s unable to do so without 
officially consulting Peter's government. He ultimately felt that Vogeli was so 
"entirely Servian in his sympathies" that he was of no use, and that the Russian 
36Adee to Hay, Washington, D.C., 13 July 1903, T-630. 
37Hay to Adee, Washington, D.C., not dated, T-630. 
38Loomis to Jackson, Washington, D.C., 18 July 1903, M-77. Loomis appears to have 
been following the opinion of the State Department as a whole. In fall 1903, Hay met informally 
with Mabel Grujic, a West Virginia native and wife of Serb diplomat Slavko Grujic. Though she 
sought information as to why the United States had not recognized Peter, Hay would only tell her 
that he "needed to take American public opinion into account." It is therefore obvious that Hay 
did not wish to be the one to re-initiate relations. See Bogdan Popovic, "Majski prevrat i SAD," 
93. 
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minister Charykov, to whom he might write in ordinary circumstances, was "liable 
to communicate with the Servian authorities."39 
While in Romania, Jackson and his family were entertained by King Carol 
I, who tended to speak with feeling about the recent events in Serbia. According to 
Jackson, the monarch had just signed new credentials for his minister at Belgrade, 
though felt it necessary to resign from his post as honorary colonel of a Serbian 
regiment. Carol did not, however, "feel at liberty to postpone longer the renewal of 
diplomatic relations," especially when Serbia imported close to a million dinars 
worth of Romanian goods the preceding year.40 
In early August, Jackson received a confidential letter from the Dutch 
minister to Serbia (who likewise was accredited to Romania), informing him that 
Peter had sent telegrams to all the European heads of state. "Either due to 
forgetfulness or economy, no [such] telegram was sent to the President. ... [The 
39Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 23 July 1903, T-630. Though Jackson was critical of Vogcli, 
one of his successors would call the vice-consul "well qualified for the post he occupies," and 
state that "the Consulate is a credit to him and to America." Moore to Department of State, 
Belgrade, 22 August 1905, T-513 . 
.wJackson to Hay, 31 July 1903, Despatches from the United States Ministers to Romania, 
1880-1906, National Archives, Microcopy No. T-727. Jackson is credited with having 
normalized relations between Washington and Bucharest, problems of which arose due to 
Romania's treatment of its Jewish population. See Dumitru Vitcu and Gabriel Badarau, "Political 
Implications of the Romanian Emigration to America up to 1918," Revue Roumaine d'Histoire 31 
(1992): 266-267. For an interesting piece on 19th century U.S.-Romanian diplomacy, see G.M. 
Razi, "Early American-Romanian Relations," East European Quarterly XXI (March 1987): 35-
65. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs] thought of doing it the next day, then hesitated, ... then 
decided merely to send an autograph letter."41 As this letter was in the course of 
preparation, Jackson asked that he be accredited as soon as it was received. 
Besides, wrote Jackson "it is not our practice to notify foreign governments of a 
change in our President.. .. [Therefore] I do not think we should be too difficile" 
with regards to King Peter.42 In addition, he telt that the new monarch was acting 
in such a way as to increase his popularity, and had shown little intention of 
mixing in party politics. 
Indeed, the reign of Peter would come to represent the culmination of 
Serbia's struggle for parliamentary govemment.43 Unlike his predecessors, Peter 
was a strict constitutionalist, who held a deep respect for the basic principles of 
democracy. He not only swore to uphold the new constitution, but also pledged 
"to devote himself to the establishment of justice and freedom in Serbia, to the 
41Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 6 August 1903, T-630. Jackson specifically asked that this 
particular correspondence not be included in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 
430n Peter and the rise of parliamentary government, see Alex N. Dragnich, "King Peter 
I: Culmination of Serbia's Struggle for Parliamentary Government," East European Quarterly 4 
(June 1970): 170-78; Idem, The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia, (Boulder: 
East European Quarterly, 1978), 95-106. 
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improvement of the economy, and to the modernization of the army."44 Of prime 
importance, however, was his belief that political leadership was to be in the hands 
of those who enjoyed a majority in the parliament. 
One of the first acts of the provisional government was to reinstall the 
skupstina elected in August 1901. In characteristic fashion, the Radical Party had 
dominated the elections, winning 84 out of 130 seats.45 Its return to power 
virtually guaranteed the selection of Peter, whose own sentiments resembled those 
of Nikola Pasic, Lazar Pacu, and other Radical leaders. The party itself enjoyed 
overwhelming support, a fact alluded to by Jackson on 24 August. 
The election of a new Skupstina takes place on September 8/2 I, 
and it is expected that a Radical majority will be returned. This 
will lead to further changes in the government, and if King Peter is 
able to affect these changes in a peaceful, constitutional manner, it 
is to be hoped that comparative tranquility-for a time at least- may 
be the result.46 
+iMichael Bora Petrovich, A History <if Modern Serhia, vol. 2 (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 537. 
-i5The most successful of Serbian parties, the Radicals were successful at mobilizing the 
Serbian peasantry behind such liberal notions as limited government, rule by law, and civil rights. 
See Gale Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism: Viadimir .Jovanovic..: and the TransfiJrmation of 
Serbian Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). See also Traian Stoianovich, 
"The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 1 (March 1959): 242-272. 
-l6Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 24 August 1903, T-630. Jackson made no distinction as to the 
old Radicals and Independent Radicals, the primary parties of the pre-election campaign. 
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By late August, Jackson was certain that Peter was "winning the good 
opinion of the people in his Capitol" and that he appeared "to have made a good 
impression ... elsewhere in the country."-17 Foreign relations were also on the 
upswing, demonstrated by the large number of representatives who had 
reestablished contact with Belgrade. As matters stood, all the ministers formerly 
accredited to Serbia (excluding the British, the Dutch, and the American) had 
presented their credentials to Peter. 
Though the United States also refused to accredit its minister, both Britain 
and the Netherlands took much firmer positions regarding the conspiratorial 
question. As referred to previously, the Dutch minister relocated to Bucharest, 
while the mission of the British envoy, Sir George Bonham, was suspended 
entirely. Charykov earlier told Jackson that as England was not directly interested 
in the Balkans it could "act on purely moral grounds."-18 This was indeed the case, 
but on 31 August, Jackson wrongly reported that Bonham would be re-accredited 
after the elections, and that the Dutch minister would receive his credentials before 
47Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 13 August 1903, T-630. 
48Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 21June1903, T-630. 
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long. 49 Whereas the United States based it reasoning on accepted protocol, neither 
Britain nor the Netherlands was willing to expose its representative to what the 
Foreign Office called "the necessity of having to shake hands with and to sit beside 
a regicide. "50 
Although Jackson did not insist upon such measures, he did show his 
displeasure with a Serbian government largely "in the power of those responsible 
for...the night of June 10th/I I th." 51 He speculated as to who indeed held power, 
and on 13 September, wrote: 
Generally the King appears to be trying to do his best in every way, 
but it is an open question as to whether he is acting in a manner to 
please those who actually rule .... One should not be surprised or 
astonished at any news which may come from Servia, or at 
anything which may happen in that country. 52 
Indeed, Jackson sent his dispatch in the wake of a botched counterconspiracy, the 
trial of which did not conclude until 26 September. It appears that a number of 
~9The issue as to whether or not Britain would re-accredit its envoy was of prime 
importance to Serbia, and rumors apparently circulated quite freely. For what is probably the 
most thorough study of Anglo-Serbian relations after 1903 see Ljiljana Aleksic-Pejkovic, Odnosi 
Srbije sa Francuskom i Engleskom, 1903-191./ (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1965). See also Zara 
S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-191./ (Cambridge: University Press, 
1969). 
50Quoted in Frances A Radovich, "The British Court and Relations with Serbia," Hast 
European Quarterly 4 (Winter 1980): 463. 
51 Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 24 August 1903, T-630. 
52Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 13 September 1903, T-630. 
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officers from the Ng garrison disapproved of the conspirators, who with the 
dynastic change moved to fill all of the better civil and military positions. Led by 
Captain Milan Novakovic, some twenty officers united under the slogan Mundire 
dole, oni iii mi! ("Remove uniforms, they or we~"), protesting the conspirators' 
corrupt, praetorian influence. 53 
Novakovic and his fellow officers insisted upon a peaceful, judicial 
intervention, frequently charging that the conspirators had violated their sworn 
military oaths. They also stated that their movement was in no way directed at the 
Karadjordjevici, leading many to believe that Peter himself was interested in 
removing the regicides from his court. 5~ Nevertheless, wrote Jackson, "it has been 
officially announced that as a constitutional sovereign, the King is bound to 
respect the amnesty granted to the original conspirators by the Skupshtina."55 In 
the end, both Novakovic and his counterconspiracy were arrested, and mild prison 
terms given to those involved. 
53See Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-190R, 70-
74. 
54It is interesting to note, however, that the counterconspiracy originated in Nis, where 
the Obrenovic dynasty enjoyed a considerable degree of support. Jackson earlier stated that in 
this city, "one or two regiments took the oath of new allegiance [to Peter] with some hesitation." 
Jackson to Hay, Belgrade, 19 June 1903, T-630. 
55Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 26 September 1903, T-630. 
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Though Peter refused to condemn the conspirators, they in fact were kept 
out of a cabinet formed after the elections of 21 September. V 6geli informed 
Jackson that Serbia's new government, a split coalition of Radicals and 
Independent Radicals, had prepared all letters announcing the accession of King 
Peter, "but none [have been] sent away yet, and no decision has been taken if they 
[will] send these letters through Diplomatic Agents, by post or if they ... [ will be 
sent through J special Envoyes. "5<' As Jackson was to leave for Athens in late 
November, he requested that the State Department forward his credentials by 
telegraph, with as little delay as possible." On 24 October, Adee instructed his 
staff that since "Peter's notification may reach us soon," it was probably time to 
"get the thing in shape, credential letter, etc. so that we can telegraph Mr. Jackson 
as he requests."57 Less than a month later, Jackson reported that a letter to 
President Theodore Roosevelt had been sent to the Serbian minister at Berlin, and 
from there it shortly would be transferred to Washington, D.C. 
By 28 November, Adee was in possession of Peter's announcement, and 
a formal reply from the President came on 11 December. Adee informed 
56Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 8 October 1903, T-630. The Independent Radicals formed in 
190 I, believing the old Radical Party opportunistic and given to quick compromise. 
57 Adee to Smith, Washington, D.C., 24 October 1903, T-630. 
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Jackson that the time for the presentation of these letters was up to him, but that he 
should plan his visit to Belgrade "so that it may not be claimed to possess any 
significance as a condonement by this government of the acts which so shocked 
the sense of all civilized peoples."58 
Adee's concern was in fact that of the entire diplomatic corps, which 
continued to insist that the conspirators be punished. In order to pressure the king, 
both the Austrian and Russian ministers agreed to a "diplomatic strike," whereby 
they would avoid any and all court functions. Other ministers followed suit, and 
by January most had taken leave of Belgrade. They did not, however, break off 
relations and according to Jackson their boycott was more social than political. 
None of them wanted to come into personal contact with the 
regicides, certain of whom still form a part of the household of 
King Peter. In this household there have been several changes 
lately, but there are even yet several adjutants and other members 
of it who took an active part in the 'removal' of King Alexander. ... 59 
Peter himself was forced to cancel a New Year's reception; the absence of foreign 
secretaries and other attaches was apparently too great an embarrassment. Instead, 
a centennial celebration for the Karadjordjevic dynasty was held in Topola, the 
58Adee to Jarkson, Washington, D.C., 15 December 1903, M-77. 
59Jackson to Hay, Athens, 24 January 1903, T-630. For a review of the diplomatic strike, 
see David MacKenzie, "The May Conspiracy and the European Powers: the Diplomatic Boycott 
Against Serbia, 1903-1906," South East European Monitor II ( 1995): 3-19. 
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home of Peter's famed grandfather, Karadjordje (Black George) Petrovic, who had 
led a Christian uprising against the Turks in 1804.60 As Peter was unwilling to 
dismiss the conspirators, court functions therefore were limited to those oflocal, as 
well as patriotic concern. 
Serbia's opposition press also was urging "the necessity of ceding to the 
opinion of Europe," deemed unanimous when the whole of the diplomatic corps 
declined invitations to a court ball in February."1 Prior to the event, Jackson stated 
that there were "constant rumors of friction in governmental circles, and another 
ministerial or worse catastrophy ... [was] thought possible at any time."r'2 This was 
indeed true, as the Grujic cabinet soon resigned due to inter-party bickering and 
the "diplomatic strike" referred to above. 
Peter at first turned to Stojan Protic, a Radical and former minister of the 
interior, in hopes of forming a new cabinet. But when Protic refused, Peter had no 
other option but to reinvest Grujic with the responsibility.63 The ministerial crisis 
60See Michael Boro Petrovich, A History of Modern Serhia, vol. I, 27-82. 
61 Quoted in Wayne S. Vucinich, Serhia Between East and West: the /'.'vents <f IY03-
1908, 85. 
62Jackson to Hay, Athens, 24 January 1904, T-630. 
63 According to V ogeli, Peter's policy of "not interfering in political matters, and in 
making ministers responsible for their actions [has made] the position of minister.. .more difficult, 
and fewer men are willing to accept office .... Under King Alexander the ministry was merely a 
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lasted more than a week, though the end result was a cabinet of noted personalities, 
including Nikola Pasic (foreign minister), Lazar Pacu (finance), Ljubomir 
Davidovic (education), and Radomir Putnik (war). 
Although Grujic's cabinet was again free of conspirators, the diplomatic 
corps continued to press Peter for their wholesale removal from court. After more 
than a month's hesitation, Peter finally conceded, issuing a royal decree in which 
the officers who had been given posts by the provisional government were now 
appointed to various regiments and their places filled by those who were not 
implicated in the conspiracy. Some in fact were promoted, but at last "the chief 
objection of the Powers against renewing diplomatic relations with Servi a has been 
removed. "64 
Credentials in hand, Jackson was now able present himself to Peter, though 
the State Department insisted that he use "cautious discretion."<>5 On 6 May t 904, 
he returned to Belgrade, and after meeting briefly with Foreign Minister Pasic, 
submitted a written request for an audience with Peter. Eager to renew relations, 
tool in the King's hands and its members were not obliged to think or act for themselves but 
merely to obey orders." Jackson to Hay, Athens, 15 February, 1904, T-630. 
65HaytoJackson, Washington, D.C., 18 February 1904, M-77. 
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the Serbian Foreign Office acted with considerable haste. "Within twenty four 
hours my calls were returned," wrote Jackson, "and on the afternoon of May 7th I 
received a communication in which it was stated that King Peter would receive me 
on Monday, the 9th."66 
Jackson learned at or around this time that the new Russian minister, 
Konstantin Gubastov, had been received with more ceremony than had heretofore 
been customary. In order that "no false impression be created," Jackson let the 
Serbian foreign office know that he expected his own reception to be "in 
accordance with the new precedent."67 This was a somewhat laughable demand, 
considering that the United States showed a paltry concern for Serbia, as well as 
for its political and economic well-being. 
Nevertheless, on 9 May Jackson was met at his hotel by Peter's court 
marshal, and taken to the palace in a carriage complete with outriders and a cavalry 
escort. Once inside the courtyard, Jackson was attended to by over a dozen 
adjutants and other court officials, while a military band incongruously played 
"Hail Columbia." Soldiers lined the palace stairs, and after a presentation of arms, 
Jackson was ushered into an audience with Peter. Upon the presentation of 
66Jackson to Hay, Athens, 14 May, 1904, T-630. 
67Ibid. 
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credentials, Jackson assured the king of the "best wishes of the President and of the 
American Government for the prosperity of Serbia .... "68 Peter responded in kind, 
stating that he was deeply touched, and that he would "neglect nothing which may 
realize and facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two countries. "<•9 
After the exchange of statements, wrote Jackson, the conversation was of an 
informal character, and refreshments were served according to Serbian national 
custom. He again met with Pasic, then sat briefly with Peter, the crown prince, and 
other members of the royal family.7') At length the king took leave, and Jackson 
returned to his hotel in the same manner in which he had come. Relations thus 
restored, he collected his belongings, then departed for Greece that evening. 
Through the summer of 1904, Jackson tended to other Greek and Romanian 
matters, but returned to Belgrade in September for Peter's coronation. As 
instructed by Secretary of State Hay, he proceeded in the company of Charles 
Wilson, a legation secretary who at times functioned as his charge d'affaires. They 
arrived to find the city filled with visitors, and brightly illuminated in honor of the 
68lbid. 
69lbid. 
70 As Peter was a widower, the royal family included two sons and a daughter, namely 
George, Alexander, and Jelena. 
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new king's coronation. The ceremony itself lasted over two and half hours, and 
though "an unusual proceeding in the present age," wrote Jackson, it effectively 
excited Belgrade's "oriental surroundings. "71 The next evening a dinner was given 
for all chiefs-of-mission, followed by a theatrical production, a military review, a 
court ball, horse races, and a mock battle. Jackson spoke briefly with Peter, 
offering his congratulations to a man whose "satisfaction and contentment were 
obvious. "72 
71Jackson to Hay, Sofia, 26 September, 1904, T-630. 
72Ibid. 
III. Pig Wars, Fakes, and Physicists, 
1905-1911 
Following Peter's coronation, Jackson informed Hay that unless something 
unusual occurred, he would not return to Serbia until spring. He stated that he had 
been given ample opportunity to speak with Peter, and that now, with the onset of 
winter, it would be best for him to retire to Athens. It was a logical move, 
considering that Jackson was aware of "an impending ministerial crisis," one 
which threatened to disrupt the government for an indefinite period of time. 1 
The crisis to which he was referring concerned the second Grujic cabinet, a 
loose conglomeration of old and Independent Radicals who no longer could work 
in unison. Their constant bickering had led Jackson to believe that Peter was much 
"too constitutional," and in need of infinitely firmer policies.2 It appears that the 
Independent Radicals, tired of what they regarded as Radical opportunism, were 
decidedly against inter-cabinet cooperation. The situation came to a head in 
December 1904, when Grujic lost even the support of his own party, the majority 
1Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 3 October 1904, T-630. 
2Jackson to Hay, Sofia, 26 September, T-630. 
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of which favored a more powerful figure at the helm. A subsequent re-shuffiing 
lead to an all-Radical cabinet under the premiership of Pasic, who also retained his 
portfolio as foreign minister. For the first time since his accession, wrote Jackson, 
"King Peter has a homogeneous cabinet, and it is hoped that the result will be 
advantageous as far as domestic matters are concemed."3 The opposite was in fact 
true, and by May 1905, Pasic himself would resign. Nevertheless, he was able to 
sway Peter towards a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement, the result of which was the 
famed Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906-11. 
Heretofore Serbia had been dependent upon Austria-Hungary for a great 
majority of its commerce. Lacking sufficient outlets, it had gravitated toward 
Vienna, in Jackson's estimation, "more or less from a sense of necessity.'.i Now 
that Pasic and other Serb Slavophiles were in power, they openly endeavored "to 
bring this state of affairs to an end. "5 By spring 1904, Serbia had entered into two 
separate treaties with Bulgaria, one of which laid the foundations for an eventual 
customs union. Jackson was highly skeptical, however, believing that "the 
3Jackson to Hay, Athens, December 17 1904, T-630. 
~Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630. 
5Ibid. On the advent of a customs treaty see Andrew Rossos, "Serbian-Bulgarian 
Relations, 1903-1914," Canadian Slavic Papers 23 (December 1981): 394-408. 
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practical Bulgarians" were willing to aid Serbia only as long as it was to "their own 
economical and political advantage. "6 He also opined that if Serbia: 
breaks with Austria-Hungary she is bound to become dependent 
upon Bulgaria (and indirectly upon Germany) .... Under the 
circumstances Bulgaria has nothing to lose and everything to gain 
from a commercial understanding with Servia, while that country 
can at best change one form of economic dependence for another.7 
Whatever the case, Serbia held firm in its belief that economic emancipation could 
be achieved through Bulgaria. Twice in 1904 Peter met with the Bulgarian Prince 
Ferdinand, and in the summer of 1905, a Serbo-Bulgarian customs agreement was 
reached. It would take effect in March l 906, though Serbian officials asked that it 
be kept secret until the conclusion of their own talks with Vienna. 
Meanwhile, the American State Department informed Jackson that it 
intended to create a second Balkan mission, thereby re-assigning him as envoy to 
the courts of Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. The ministerships of Serbia and 
Romania would continue to be under one legate, a presidential appointee by the 
name of John W. Riddle. As Riddle was not scheduled to arrive in Belgrade until 
the spring of 1906, it was suggested that Thomas Ewing Moore, Riddle's charge d' 
6Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630. 
7lbid. Serbia signed a commercial treaty with Germany on 28 November 1904. See 
Horst M. Lorsheider, "The Commercial Treaty between Germany and Serbia," Central European 
History 9 (June 1976): 129-145. 
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affaires ad interim, be introduced personally to Peter. Afterwards Jackson was to 
present his own letter of recall, and to take leave of Belgrade entirely. 
On 12 July, both Moore and Jackson attended a reception in honor of the 
king's birthday, a hearty affair in which Peter offered the new minister his "sincere 
expressions of good-will. "8 Moore then met with the diplomatic corps, and at 
length was introduced to Serbia's new foreign minister, Jovan Zujovic.9 There was 
of course no mention of Serbo-Bulgarian affairs, though for some time, stated 
Jackson, it was obvious that the two countries had formed an "anti-Austrian 
combination. "10 
The following afternoon Jackson arranged for an official audience with 
Peter, who subsequently thanked him for "making closer the relations between the 
United States and Servia."11 The king then spoke with great interest regarding 
America's Serb communities, and questioned Jackson as to the publication of 
Serbo-American newspapers, such as San Francisco's Nezavisnost (Independence), 
8Moore to Secretary of State, Sinaia, 25 July 1905, T-630. 
9Two days earlier, Zujovic had forwarded a letter expressing his government's regret at 
the death of Secretary of State John Hay, whom he called a "citoyen tres distingue et homme d' 
Etat eminent." Jackson to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 10 July 1905, T-630. 
'°Jackson to Hay, Athens, 20 April 1905, T-630. 
11 Jackson to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 13 July 1905, T-630. 
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New York's Srpski Rodoljub (Serbian Patriot), and Chicago's Ujedinjeno Srpstvo 
(Serbian Union), three prominent publications of I 905. 12 When Jackson at last 
departed he was given an autographed photo of Peter, ostensibly to commemorate 
his brief, yet eventful stay. 
Moore himself remained in Belgrade for another ten days, witnessing the 
general elections of 23 July. He recorded that over 1,000 candidates were vying 
for only I 60 seats; all told they comprised seven voter lists drawn from nine 
different parties. To Moore, such a system of was curious indeed. He wrote: 
Inasmuch as a good proportion of the Servian peasant-population 
is illiterate, it is necessary to adopt a means of enabling the 
electors ... to recognize the difference in the lists. They may only 
vote for one party, that is to say choose one of the lists, and their 
votes go to all named on the list selected.... Each party has its own 
ballot box and they are distinguished by being of different colours. 
At Belgrade, for instance, there were seven boxes, placed sided by 
side, having all the colors of the rainbow. 13 
The final returns gave the Independent Radicals a one-vote majority, and control of 
the ruling skupstina. Unsurprisingly, the margin proved to be too narrow to 
establish any real degree of cabinet stability. For the next eight months, the 
12For an extensive list of Serbo-American newspapers, see Adam S. Eterovich, A Guide 
and Bibliography to Research on Yugoslavs in the United States and Canada (Palo Alto: 
Ragusan Press, 1978), 47-54. See also Robert P. Gakovich and Milan M. Radovich, Serbs in the 
United States and Canada: A Comprehensive Bibliography (St. Paul: University of Minnesota 
Immigration History Research Center, 1992), 133-157. 
13Moore to Secretary of State, Sinaia, 31 July 1905, T-630. 
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Independents struggled with Serbia's myriad crises, the greatest of which was the 
country's souring relations with Austria-Hungary. 
Late in 1905 Austrian authorities discovered that Serbia and Bulgaria were 
planning to create their own customs union, one which would give Belgrade 
additional transport and shipping privileges. Enraged, Vienna subsequently broke 
off negotiations and by January 1906, it had closed its borders to Serbian 
commerce. 14 The effect was immediate, and altogether severe. Between 1905 and 
1906, Serbian exports to Austria declined by over 34.6 million dinars, and imports 
by another 11 million. In like manner, trade with the United States declined 
precipitously, and in 1906 the Serbian Ministry of Finance recorded an utter 
absence of American imports. A plausible explanation appears to be that Austrian 
intermediaries could no longer afford to transport American goods, especially 
when Serbia began to impose higher tariff rates on the Dual Monarchy. 
With the onset of the "Pig War," Serbia realized that its economic survival 
rested on the procurement of alternative commercial outlets. To this end, Pasic's 
second government enlisted the support of Russia, France, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Turkey, the latter of which granted transit rights to Salonika and a 
14The most authoritative study on the Austro-Serbian "Pig War" is by Dimitrije 
Djordjevic, Carinski ratAustro-ugarske i Srbije 1906-1911(Belgrade,1962). 
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loading zone in its harbor. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way to economic 
recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total commerce. Over 
the next five years, trade with the United States would rise associatively. 
Table 2 
Serbian Trade with the United States, 
1905-1911 
(in dinars) 
Exports Imports 
Year kg. value % kn o· value % 
1905 942,207 1,298,877 2.03 
1906 
1907 779 2,600 299,434 186,011 0.26 
1908 1,301,508 1,985,500 2.71 524,490 473,970 0.63 
1909 2,081,305 3,005,090 3.23 931,637 869,960 118 
1910 2,673,258 3,867,370 3.93 1,080,666 1,011,259 119 
1911 2,544,007 3,609,310 3.08 1,729,389 2,135,672 1.85 
Source: Statistika .\po/ja.\:nje trgovine Kr. Srb!je. 1905-1911. 
Starting at a meager 186,000 dinars in 1907, the value of imports from the 
United States peaked at a sizable 2.1 million in 1911. Though they continued to 
represent a small portion of all Serbian imports, goods from America were 
consequently of greater value than those purchased from Romania, Bulgaria, or 
Greece. What is most surprising, however, is that during this period Serbia 
managed to increase its own exports to the United States. From 1 908 to 1911, 
Serbian exports averaged over 3.1 million dinars per year, a number which 
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exceeded that of the previous twenty years combined. While coffee continued to 
be the most imported of American goods, Serbia exported large quantities of dried 
fruit and copper. 15 
The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was of great interest to the American 
shipping industry. First, in 1905-06 the American Car Company explored the 
viability of constructing a train car factory at Nis. 16 Then in 1907, the firm Balston 
Brown approached the Serbian government regarding the construction of railway 
lines, and in particular, of a much coveted route to the Adriatic. Like those of 
other nations, American businesses hoped to capitalize on a Danube-Adriatic 
railway, that would circumvent Austria, as well as its projected train line though 
Novi Pazar. 17 Perhaps the most interesting of proposals came in 1909, when the 
American Engineering Company offered to construct a canal between the Danube 
and the Aegean Sea. As the canal was to traverse Turkish territory, Serbian 
15For an excellent study of Serbian mines and foreign capital see Danica Milic, Strani 
kapital u nidarstvu Srbije do 191 Bg (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1970). 
16Concerning the American Car Company, Balston Brown, and the American 
Engineering Company, see Danica Milic, "Privredne veze SAD i Srbije do prvog svetskog rata," 
131-132. 
17For an excellent summary of the proposed Danube-Adriatic railway, see Wayne S. 
Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908, 210-230. See also Arthur J. 
May, "Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes," The Journal of Modern History XXIV (December 
1952): 352-367; Idem, "The Novi Bazar Railroad Project," Journal of Modern History X 
(December 1938): 496-527. 
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officials refused to entertain the proposal without an agreement with 
Constantinople. 
In the end, none of the above plans was acted upon, though their very 
existence revealed that American firms were aware of what Moore called "a 
great new field, rich in trade possibilities."18 Nevertheless, without direct 
commercial links, Serbia and the other Danubian countries were relatively 
inaccessible to the United States, especially when business there could "only be 
availed of with caution and through trustworthy agents on the spot. "19 Christian 
Vogeli was one such agent, and from 1905 to 1910, New York Life averaged 
almost 1600 insurance policies per year.20 Needless to say, other American 
companies were less venturous, neglecting "trade opportunities entirely in these 
countries of far Eastern Europe."21 
On 23 April 1906, Minister Riddle at last arrived in Belgrade, assuming his 
post after similar work in Cairo. He met with Peter on 7 May, and after brief 
introductions the two men spoke casually regarding the recent San Francisco fire. 
18Moore to Loomis, Sinaia, 22 August 1905, T-513 
19Jackson to Hay, Athens, I 4 January 1905, T-630. 
20Milic, "Domaei i strani kapital u osiguranju (Srbija do 1914)," 25. 
21 Moore to Loomis, Belgrade, 22 August 1905, T-513. 
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The king expressed deep regret, though at the same time he was confident that 
"American energy would soon efface all traces of material damage. "22 He did 
not, however, touch upon any of the "unpalatable questions" affecting Serbian 
affairs.23 
The first such question regarded trade relations with Austria-Hungary. In 
early 1906, Serbia was feeling the baneful effects of an imposed economic 
embargo. Not satisfied with simple tariff concessions, Vienna insisted that Serbia 
agree to a series of irrelevant conditions, mostly regarding bank loans and 
proposed military contracts. Riddle at once stated that these conditions were "so 
onerous that no [Serbian] ministry could accept them and still stand. "24 
Nevertheless, Austrian officials held firm, believing that if the skupstina refused 
their proposals, the Serbs would soon "suffocate in their own swine fat. "25 
The second and third questions were in themselves connected. First, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands still refused to re-accredit their envoys until all of the 
regicides had been removed. Since none of them were on duty at court, this meant 
22Riddle to Elihu Root (Secretary of State), Belgrade, 9 May 1906, T-630. 
23Ibid. 
25Quoted in Zeljan Suster, "Serbia's Economic Relations with the West Before World 
War I," Serbian Studies 7 (Fall 1993): 37. 
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retiring those who had been reassigned (and even promoted) to posts outside of 
Belgrade. In order to do so, Peter would have to confront a conspiratorial faction 
that had come to exert an enormous amount of influence, at times affecting 
"military appointments, [the] procurement of military supplies and credits, and in 
general any basic issue before the government. "26 
Indeed this was no small task, though Peter ultimately had the support of 
Nikola Pasic, who was once again head of a new cabinet. According to Riddle: 
The prime minister is desirous of settling the question 
forthwith, as he expresses the opinion that his party would 
triumphantly carry the approaching elections if it could go before 
the country with the prestige of having solved this question, for 
even the peasants feel strongly on the subject and realize the 
stigma which is cast upon Servia in the opinion of foreign 
nations.27 
Thus in collusion with Pa.Sic, Peter decided to retire the remaining conspirators.28 
On 16 May 1906, Pasic informed Great Britain that the final six regicides 
(Popovic, Masin, Misic, Lazarevic, Kostic, and Atanackovic) had been pensioned 
off and would not return to their positions. The Foreign Office responded 
26Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West: the Events of 1903-1908, l02. 
27Riddle to Root, Belgrade, 9 May 1906, T-630. 
280n Pasic's role in the dismissal of the remaining officers, see Alex N. Dragnich, Serbia, 
Nikola PaSi<5, and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974). 
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favorably, and on 11 June, exactly three years after the Belgrade coup, Anglo-
Serbian relations were restored.29 It was a major diplomatic breakthrough, though 
increased Serbian ties with Britain were anathema to Austrian interests.30 
By mid-1906, the great alliances of Europe had all but materialized; for this 
reason Germany and Austria feared British, French, Italian, and Russian influence 
over Belgrade. Led by a determined foreign minister, Count Alois Lexa von 
Aehrenthal, the Dual Monarchy therefore began to pursue a more active policy in 
the Balkans.31 The Austro-Serbian "Pig War" was the first step, followed by plans 
to construct a railroad connecting the Sanjak of Novi Pazar with Salonika. By 
doing so, Aehrenthal hoped to isolate the states of Serbia and Montenegro, thereby 
ending any greater-Serb or Yugo-slav aspirations. 32 In fall 1908, Vienna made its 
most aggressive move to date. After brief negotiations with the Russian foreign 
29The Dutch minister, Baron de Welderen Rengers, at last would present his credentials 
on 19 November 1906. 
3
°Conceming Austria and Britain, see Alfred Francis Pribram, Austria-Hungary and 
Great Britain, 1908-191./ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951). 
31 See Alfred Francis Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918 (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1923). See also F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: the Foreign Policy of 
Austria-Hungary, 1866-191./ (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). 
32As to this point, see John D. Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University Press, 1983). See also Soloman Wank "Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of 
Novibazar Railway Project: A Reappraisal," Slavonic and East European Review XLII (June 
1964): 353-69. 
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minister Alexander Izvolsky, Aehrenthal announced the annexation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 33 
The ensuing crisis nearly brought Europe to war, though at length Serbia 
was forced to accept the Austrian acquisitions. Nevertheless, for Pasic and other 
Serb leaders the annexation of Bosnia was an unpardonable act that threatened the 
very existence of the Serb nation. For over five months they refused to recognize 
the annexation, claiming that: ( 1) it was illegal under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, 
and that (2) ifthe Great Powers were willing to accept such a change, then Serbia 
should be entitled to some sort of territorial compensation, most likely the Sanjak 
ofNovi Pazar. 
In contrast, the United States accepted the annexation with great 
indifference, maintaining that as a non-participant (in both the Congress of Berlin 
and in Balkan affairs at large) it had little business expressing an overt, potentially 
complicated opinion. To this end the State Department instructed Riddle's 
replacement, a Delaware native by the name of Horace G. Knowles, that he should 
33Known as the famous "Buchlau Bargain," Izvolsky and Aehrenthal agreed that Austria 
could annex Bosnia-Hercegovina if the Turkish Straits were reopened to Russian warships. For a 
general overview see Barbara Jelavich, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs (Chicago: 
Rand McNally and Company, 1969), 152-153. Also of interest is Bernadotte Schmitt's The 
Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; reprint, New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1970), 19-29 (page references to reprint edition); and John D. Treadway's 
The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-19 J.I (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University Press, 1983 ). 
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remain in Bucharest, thereby dispelling "any active [American] interest in the 
situation."34 Nevertheless, Knowles followed the Serb reaction closely, reporting 
that the entire population was "thoroughly aroused," and insisting upon "an 
immediate war with Austria."35 He ultimately felt, however, that the Serbians: 
are as excitable as they are poor and helpless.... They will parade 
through the cities, make violent speeches and close the schools for 
a few days, but, they will not make war against Austria. Before 
this dispatch reaches you [Secretary of State Elihu Root], you will 
have heard, in all probability, the passing of the war cloud from 
over Servia.36 
Meanwhile, America's Serb communities were expressing a similar 
indignation. On 11 October 1908, the Committee of the Servians of New York 
petitioned President Theodore Roosevelt "to use the influence of his exalted 
position [so] that the rights of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina are protected. "37 
The Servian National Committee of San Francisco hoped that the United States, as 
the "exemplar of fair dealing and justice among nations of the earth," would 
3~Rootto Knowles, Washington, D.C., 7 October 1908, Numerical and Minor Files of the 
Department of State, 1906-1910, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-862. Riddle left 
Bucharest on 23 January 1907, and was replaced by Knowles, a former consul at Bordeaux, 
France, in July of that year. 
35Knowles to Root, Bucharest, 6 October 1908, M-862. 
37Committee of Servians of New York to Roosevelt, New York, I I October I908, M-
862. 
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"intercede on behalf of Bosnia and Hercegovina .... "38 A meeting of Pennsylvania 
Serbs, all of whom had fled to America from "the tyranny of Austria," asked the 
President to "offer aid to their brethren ... [in order] to free and unite all Serbs."39 
The White House also received petitions from Serbian groups outside the 
United States. Writing "in the name of friends in the Servian Parliament" two 
London based nationals (giving only the names Lazarovich and Hrebelianovich) 
informed Roosevelt that: 
the sudden and arbitrary annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
has robbed the populations of those Servian lands of all hope of 
national development and liberty and is the first step towards the 
annihilation of the independent Kingdom of Servia. Our very 
existence as a people is in peril.40 
To this they added a brief appeal, imploring Roosevelt to aid a people "whose own 
watchword" was a familiar "give me liberty or give me death. "41 
An interesting note from the Committee of Servi an Women (Belgrade) was 
sent to Edith Roosevelt, and then to First Lady-Elect Helen Taft. Written by 
Nadegeda Petrovic, it stated: 
38Servian National Committee to Roosevelt, San Francisco, 20 October 1908, M-862. 
39Pavlovitch to Roosevelt, Pittsburgh, 20 October 1908, M-862 
.\()Lazarovich and Hrebelianovich, London, 8 October 1908, M-862. 
41 lbid. 
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We believe Madame, that you may be induced to interest the noble 
and liberal minded women of the United States of America on 
behalf of the said Committee of Servian Women, in order that they 
too may raise their voice in the cause of Justice and Liberty and 
save these two countries [Bosnia and Hercegovina] from slavery, 
which has been abolished in the United States of America more 
than half a century ago.42 
Though Roosevelt failed to answer the petition, Taft ultimately expressed 
sympathy with the Committee and their struggle for Bosnian independence. By 
doing so she incurred the wrath of the Austrian consul, who questioned President 
Roosevelt as to the matter on 28 December 1908. Claiming ignorance, he 
promised to correspond with the Tafts at the earliest possible moment. The 
following day he wrote to them, stating: 
I know nothing of the incident, but I am glad to tell you what I 
think are undoubtedly the facts in the Balkans. No better bit of 
governmental work has been done in Europe than the work of the 
Austrians in governing Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is objected to 
by precisely the type of individual who objects to our having 
interfered in the Philippines, Santo Domingo, and Panama. I need 
hardly tell you that while Serbia has done better as an independent 
power than she did under Turkey, she has done hideously, 
nevertheless. The present King is the beneficiary of an 
assassination of the most atrocious kind, and the real authors of the 
assassination have never been punished. I hope and believe that 
the Southern Slavs will ultimately grow able to stand by themselves 
and do as well as the Bulgarians and Romanians have done~ 
but at present independence or annexation to Serbia would work 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina very much as [William Jennings] 
42Petrovic to Edith Roosevelt, Belgrade, 16 November 1908, M-862. 
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Bryan's theory of immediate independence would work for the 
Philippines.43 
It is ironic that the person to whom the Serbs so earnestly appealed was a 
firm believer in Austrian administration. In addition, Roosevelt thought that 
Serbia was the worst governed of all the Balkan states (excluding Turkey), and in 
1911 wrote that "it must be pretty awful to be connected with the Serbian royal 
family!"4-1 Such opinions aside, neither Roosevelt nor the United States 
government wished to get involved in a dispute so removed from American 
interests. Nevertheless, a few American newspapers suggested that he take a more 
prominent role in the crisis, possibly through an international conference like the 
one held at Algeciras some five years earlier. Best summarized by the Indianapolis 
Star, these editorials felt that it was a great chance for Roosevelt "to make a hit by 
restoring peace in the Balkans. "45 But for the most part, American papers tended to 
43Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, Washington, D.C., 29 December 1908. The /,e/ters 
of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison, vol. 6, The Big Stick, 1907-1909 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1952), 1447. On Roosevelt and Bulgaria, see "Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Bulgarians," Bulgarian Review 5 (December 1965): 72-73. See also Marin Pundeff, 
"Stefan Panaretov and Bulgarian-American Relations," Bulgarian Historical Review 17 (1989): 
26. 
~Roosevelt to George Trevelyn, Oyster Bay, 1 October 1911. The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison, vol. 7, The Days of Armageddon, 1909-191-1 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1954 ), 363. Roosevelt also described Prince Alexander as a "dreadful 
creature," though he only had met him on one occasion. 
45 Indianapolis Star, 7 October 1908. 
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echo the Washington Post, which held that as "a friend of all nations concerned," 
the United States would not allow itself to be "drawn into their quarrels. "46 
Eventually, Knowles departed Bucharest on 4 February 1909, some two 
months before the crisis had passed.47 Therefore the United States was without an 
envoy to Serbia, at a time, wrote one official, when Europe was undergoing 
"kaleidoscopic changes."48 By the beginning of March war appeared so imminent 
that the American charge d' affaires in Bucharest inquired as to whether the State 
Department needed a temporary representative in Belgrade, ostensibly to give "an 
inside historical account of what may transpire there. "49 
~Washington Post, 6 October 1908. This appeared to be the prudent position to take, 
especially when even the tiny Serb state of Montenegro was looking for American support. In 
May 1909 and again in 1911, King Nikola I unbelievably offered a strip of Adriatic coastline to 
the United States so that it could construct and maintain its own European naval base. See 
Richard D. Challener, "Montenegro and the United States: A Balkan Fantasy," Journal of Central 
European Affairs XVII (October 1957): 236-42. See also Dragan Zivojinovic, "Ustanak Malisora 
1911. godine i americka pomoc Crnoj Gori," Istorijski Zapisi XX (1967): 323-38. 
47Knowles received a subsequent recommission to Nicaragua. 
48Charles Francis to Philander C. Knox (Secretary of State), Vienna, 20 March 1909, M-
862. 
49Norman Hutchinson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 1 March 1909, M-862. Around 
this time the State Department received another inquiry, this one from Silver, Burdett, and 
Company, a well known textbook publisher. The company was desirous of information 
pertaining to the new boundaries of Austria-Hungary, and wanting to know in particular if 
Bosnia-Hercegovina was now "an acquired territory" of the Habsburg Empire. Silver, Burdett, 
and Company to Secretary of State, New York, 12 May 1909, M-862. 
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The State Department ignored his suggestion, while the next two 
appointees, Huntington Wilson and Spencer F. Eddy, failed even to make the 
journey to Belgrade. Both men were given the title envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary, though for whatever reason they failed to accept their 
missions.50 On 25 September 1909, John R. Carter received the appointment, 
finally presenting his credentials over seven months later, in May 1910. For the 
next year Carter served as E.E. and M.P. to the courts of Romania, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria, and in turn witnessed two of the most bizarre episodes in the course of 
Serbo-American relations. 51 
The first occurred in the spring of 1910, when Serbia's envoy to Paris, 
Milenko Vesnic, issued a sharp denial that Crown Prince Alexander and his 
brother George were seeking wealthy American brides. Though the story first 
appeared in a 1908 edition of the New York Times, it soon was picked up and 
reprinted in newspapers throughout the country. It held that a Russian general 
named "Tcherf Spiridonovitch" was acting as a matrimonial agent, and that he 
50Wilson ultimately declined the appointment; Eddy served at Bucharest but never went 
to Belgrade. See Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and United 
States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1990, 164-66. 
51The Bulgarian mission, formerly filled by a "diplomatic agent," was elevated to full 
envoyship in June 1910 and added to the exiting Serb/Romanian post. A brraduate of Harvard 
Law School, Carter came to Belgrade after serving as an embassy secretary in London. 
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diligently was searching for interested American families. When Vesnic caught 
wind of the reports, he immediately dismissed them as false. "Should either of the 
future princes at any future time go to America," he stated, "it will be only to visit 
the country and study institutions which are especially interesting in Serbia, the 
most democratic kingdom in old Europe."52 
The second event occurred some six months later, when a man by the name 
of Stefan Dusanovitch filed a complaint with the State Department, demanding 
that a New York justice of the peace make "a complete and immediate apology" for 
serving him with an official court summons. 53 Styling himself the "Prince of 
Rashka," Dusanovitch believed that he possessed a kind of diplomatic immunity 
under which he was exempt from legal proceedings. The Department's Diplomatic 
Bureau initially had no idea who Dusanovitch was. Someone suggested that he 
had ties to the ruling house of Petrovic-Njegos in Montenegro, but when this 
proved false, the letter was passed on to Second Assistant Alvey A. Adee. 
Adee at once recognized Dusanovitch as that "lunatic" who had earlier 
approached the Department with claims to the Serbian throne. Amazing as it may 
52New York Times, 28 March 1910. 
53de LaPoer Browsman to Knox, East Hampton, N.Y., 23 October 1910, Records 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Serbia and to Political Relations Between the United States and 
Serbia, 1910-29, National Archives, Microcopy No. M-357. 
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seem, Dusanovitch was only one of numerous pretenders seeking recognition 
through the American government. In June 1903, the New York Times reported 
that a Brooklyn wine merchant named Louis B. Cociancich had papers proving he 
was king.54 Though nothing came of it, another would-be monarch emerged in 
1905 from of all places, County Line, Iowa. His name was Theodore M. Streu, 
and after corresponding directly with the Belgrade consulate, insisted that 
Secretary of State Root take "such further action [in naming him king] as may be 
considered expedient. "55 
Of course nothing came of these proposals, though Dusanovitch, 
Cociancich, and Streu elicited stem recriminations from America's Serb 
community. In November 1912, two of its leaders, Paul H. Pavlovitch and Milan 
Yeftich, issued a statement condemning them as "fakers" who were "shamelessly 
abusing the name of the Serbian people."56 They went on to state that due to some 
basic historical facts, "no honest man would to-day even think of calling himself a 
54The New York Times, 13 June 1903. 
55Moore to Bacon (Assistant Secretary of State}, Bucharest, 9 December 1905, T-513. 
56The New York Times, 26 November 1912. At the time, Pavlovitch was the secretary of 
the Serb Federation Sloga, and Yeftich was the editor of The Servian Daily. 
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Servian noble."57 Nevertheless, Dusanovitch remained quite vocal in his claims, 
and even went so far as to enlist a "Comptroller of the Household" named G. W. de 
LaPoer Browsman. 
It was Browsman who in 1911 asked that "His Imperial Highness" be 
appointed as a volunteer aid to Major General W. H. Carter of Fort Sam Houston, 
Texas. According to Browsman, Dusanovitch was "most anxious to see active 
service with the troops of the United States," and hoped that the Department would 
answer his request "with propriety."58 After a few more isolated (and ultimately 
unanswered) letters, both Dusanovitch and Browsman faded into obscurity. 
Just over a month later, a more famous person would enter the realm of 
Serbo-American relations, this time with the proper recognition of the United 
States government. His name was Michael ldvorsky Pupin, an eminent physicist 
and inventor, and in May 1911 Peter appointed him as Consul-General to both the 
United States and Canada.59 Apart from Nikola Tesla, Pupin was the most 
celebrated of Serbian-Americans, having immigrated from the Banat region of 
57 Ibid. They obviously were referring to the Turkish conquests of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries which had decimated Serbia's native nobility. 
58de LaPoer Browsman to Knox, Amagansett, N.Y., 11March1911, M-357. 
590n the advent of Serbo-Canadian relations, see Nicholas Pasic, "Diplomatic Relations 
Between Canada and Serbia," Serbian Studies 4(Spring 1987): 77-86. 
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Vojvodina in 1874. His scientific work dealt primarily with electromechanics, and 
as a professor at Columbia University, Pupin held the patents to over thirty 
inventions.60 As an author, speaker, and philanthropist, Pupin was a conscious 
proponent of Americanization, and by the mid 1920s his autobiography, From 
Immigrant to Inventor, was a popular text in American high schools.61 
Nevertheless, Pupin maintained close ties with America's Serb communities, and 
after 1908, became one of its most prominent members.62 Before then he was 
politically inactive, though with the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he helped 
to found an American protest organization called the Srpski Narodni Centralni 
Odbor (Serbian National Central Committee). 
Expecting a war with Austria, Pupin's committee raised large sums of 
money for the Red Cross organizations of both Serbia and Montenegro. Though 
the crisis passed, Pupin remained a prominent fixture in the political life of 
60Pupin began teaching mathematical physics at Columbia University in 1890. For an 
authoritative study of Pupin's work, see Slavko Boksan, Mihaila Pupin i njegovo de/o (Novi Sad: 
Marica srpska, 1951 ). 
61 In fact, Pupin's work From Immigrant to Inventor (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1923), won a Pulitzer Prize in 1924. For a related article see Vladislav Tomovic, "M.I. Pupin-
A Pulitzer Prize Winner -in the Eyes of American Readers," Serbian Studies 2 (Spring/Fall 
1983): 69-78. 
62For an excellent review of Pupin's involvement in America's Serb communities see 
Michael Boro Petrovich, "Pupin in Serbian-American Life before the First World War," Serbian 
Studies 4 (Fall/Spring 1986/1987): 5-27. 
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Serbian-Americans, and in 1911 received word that he had been named Serbia's 
Consul-General in New York. The post itself was honorary, and although Pupin 
was given no salary, supplies, or budget, he opened an office with his own funds 
that year.63 The end result was entirely beneficial for Serbia. With the outbreak of 
the Balkan Wars in 1912, Pupin became a vociferous supporter of the Serbian 
cause. For the next two years he would perform various functions for the Serbian 
government, including the issuance of passports to immigrants who had come to 
America from Macedonia, Kosovo, and other regions liberated from Turkey. 
During World War I he was particularly active, funding Red Cross detachments, 
giving speeches, and organizing volunteers for transport to Europe. 
63See Bozidar Puric. Biografija Boze Rankoviea: Doprinos istoriji srpskog iseljeni.iitva u 
Severnoj Americi (Munich: Iskra, 1963): 68. 
IV. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 
The year 1912 was of pivotal interest to the Balkan states, and for Serbia it 
signified its final liberation from the Ottoman Empire. Though an independent 
kingdom since 1878, Serbia had long coveted the Turkish territories surrounding 
Ohrid and Skopje, collectively known as "Old Serbia." It was here that the 
powerful Nemanjic dynasty had established a medieval empire, and to a majority of 
Serbians, this area was unquestionably Serbia irredenta. 1 Expansion southward 
was given further impetus with the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. If 
Serbia was unable to secure land from Austria-Hungary, it assuredly could snatch a 
province or two from the moribund Ottoman Empire. To achieve this end, 
Belgrade officials entered into a series of separate agreements with Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, and Greece, the aim being to partition the European holdings of 
Turkey. Ironically enough, this "Balkan League" of 1912 was borne of an idea 
1In the years prior to 1912, those territories claimed by Serbia were being depleted of 
their Serbian populations, many of whom fled to America to escape the political unrest and 
lawlessness of European Turkey. See Jovan Pejin, "Iseljavanje iz Kosovskog vilajeta i drugih 
krajeva pod Turcima u SAD 1906-1907. godine." Jstorijski Glasnik 1-2 (1985): 49-54. Another 
work of interest regarding the United States and Turkish Macedonia is by Hristo Andonov-
Polyanski, The Attitude of the U.S.A. Towards Macedonia (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 
1983). See also Christ Anastasoff, "The Illenden Insurrection of 1903 and Contemporary 
American Reaction," Balkania 2 (October 1968): 18-21. 
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defensive in nature. Supported by Tsarist Russia, the League originally fonned 
with the goal of keeping an aggressive Austria in check.2 It soon became clear, 
however, that the Balkan states could not be controlled by their sponsor, and in the 
fall of 1912, each government was making final preparations for war. 
Though Serbia had become increasingly belligerent towards Turkey, this 
had not always been the case. Prime Minister Milovan Milovanovic was for a 
number of years an ardent Russophile, and until his death in July 1912, Serbia 
followed the St. Petersburg line. In doing so, he promoted defensive treaties such 
as the one fonned between Belgrade and Sofia in March 1912, which pledged each 
to take joint action against any nation that tried to "annex, occupy, or even 
temporarily ... invade" any Balkan province under Turkish rule. 3 Obviously directed 
at Austria-Hungary, the treaty also called for Russian arbitration in the settlement 
of future territorial disputes. 
To be sure, Serbia and Bulgaria held lengthy discussions concerning the 
future of Turkish Macedonia. Both countries wished to annex all or part of this 
20n Russia and the Balkan League see Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan 
Alliance of 1912 (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965). See also Andrew 
Rossos, Russia and the Balkans (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 8-69, and P.E. 
Mosely. "Russian Policy in 1911-1912," Journal <>/Modern History XII (March 1940): 69-86. 
3Quoted in Petrovich, vol. II, 595. For a brief study of Milovanovic's career, see 
Dimitrije Djordjevic, Milovan Milovanovi<5 (Beograd: Prosveta, 1962). 
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territory, and by mid 1912, they seemed willing to wage war for it. Although 
Serbia appeared slightly more aggressive with the death ofMilovanovic, the 
American envoy, John B. Jackson, did not think that the new cabinet would 
"initiate any [sort of] adventurous policy."4 Nonetheless, by 15 September the 
United States consul to Belgrade, Maddin Summers, reported that "war was being 
clamored for on every side," and that the Serbian government had issued a 
prohibition on the export of wheat, com, and other foodstuffs deemed necessary 
should conflict arise. 5 Two weeks later Peter declared a moratorium on all private 
contracts, just one, stated Jackson, of the "extraordinary appropriations" passed to 
cover the cost of mobilization and war.6 
Such measures notwithstanding, the Serbs failed to engage Turkey until 1 7 
October, nearly ten days after their allies, the Montenegrins. Within a short period 
of time, however, the Serbian army had crossed the border into Macedonia, and on 
4Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 3 July 1912, M-357. Jackson was reappointed 
as E.E. and M.P. to the courts of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania on 12 August 1911. 
5Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 September 1912, M-357. Summers was 
appointed as Consul-General to Serbia in 1911, though a majority of his career was spent in 
Brazil, Bolivia, and other South American countries. 
6Jackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, IO October 1912, M-357. 
The Balkan Wars I 64 
24 October it scored a decisive victory at Kumanovo.7 By now war had opened on 
three fronts, and the outnumbered Turks were retiring quickly from Europe. 
Casualties were great on all sides, and by the end of the month, reported Summers, 
Belgrade was in "great need of medical and pecuniary assistance."8 In mid-
November he reported that the number of wounded in Serbia was approaching 
16,000, and that the city's schools, universities, and other buildings were acting as 
make-shift hospitals. 
In addition, Red Cross representatives were arriving from countries 
throughout Europe, and soon they established base camps in cities such as 
Belgrade and Nis. Russian and German volunteers were especially prominent, 
though Summers believed that "no little surprise and regret is felt here" at 
America's failure to help.9 He also thought that 
70n Serbia's entrance into the First Balkan War, see Ivan S. Pavlovic, Poeetak rata sa 
Turcima 1912 (Beograd: 1941). Though there are few works in English, two studies appear to be 
useful. See Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1938) and Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic eds., East Central 
European Society and the Balkan Wars (Boulder: Social Science Mono!,>raphs, 1987). 
8Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 28 October 1912, M-357. 
9Ibid. Though the United States was slow to send humanitarian aid, it did order two 
warships, the U.S.S. Tennessee and the U.S.S. Montana to Smyrna and Beirut respectively. Their 
mission was to protect American interests in the Mediterranean. See Harry N. Howard, "The 
United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits: The Foundation of American Policy (1830-
1914)," Balkan Studies 3 (1962): 26-27. 
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if only from a purely commercial standpoint, we should respond at 
once to the suffering.... In recent years a flourishing commerce has 
grown up with the United States, and this has brought the people 
here into a closer contact and appreciation of the American 
people .... Anything which we might be able to do [therefore] would 
be deeply appreciated ... 10 
Indeed, one of the cities for which the Balkan allies were fighting, Salonika, was a 
major outlet for goods to and from the United States. In 1912 alone, Serbian 
Year 
1912 
1913* 
kg. 
2,736,000 
Table 3 
Serbian Trade with the United States, 
1912-1913 
(in dinars) 
Exports Imports 
value % kg. value 
3,921,600 4.65 911,321 1,283,072 
Notes:(*) Statistics for 1913 were incomplete due to the Second Balkan War. 
Source: Statistika .\poljaJnje trgovine Kr. Srhije. 1912. 
% 
1.20 
exports to America were worth nearly four million dinars, though imports from the 
United States suffered considerably from Serbia's wartime expenses. Nevertheless, 
the war itself peaked the interest of American manufacturers, and on three separate 
occasions Summers reported that bids were being submitted for both equipment 
and supplies. 
101bid. 
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According to Jackson, however, the entire effort to equip and mobilize the 
Serbian army had left it ill-prepared, and "without sufficient time to fit up hospitals 
and to make other sanitary preparations." 11 The American Red Cross eventually 
responded, authorizing Summers to make a one thousand dollar contribution to 
Prime Minister Pasic, who subsequently conveyed "his expressions of greatest 
gratitude. "12 
By mid-December, the American Red Cross had sent upwards of ten 
thousand dollars to Serbia, just one of five belligerents to which funds were given. 
Summers believed that the money would be better spent if it went directly to the 
families of those at war, particularly when the country was "depleted ofmen." 13 He 
also stated that 
practically one tenth of the whole population responded to the call, 
and were put either into the field or on guard duty .... If the same 
percentage responded to a similar call in the United States, we 
would be confronted with the task of officeering, arming, and 
supplying almost l 0,000,000 men. The same applies to the other 
Balkan States, and we can also imagine the temporary misery that 
would result to the homes of ten million men in a bloody fight for 
their country. 14 
llJackson to Secretary of State, Bucharest, 5 November 1912, M-357. 
12Pasic to Summers, Belgrade, 9 November 1912, M-357. 
13Maddin Summers, Report on Hospital Work in Belgrade, 11December1912, M-357. 
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Despite repeated requests on the part of Summers, George W. Davis, the 
chairman of the American Red Cross, refused to accept the proposal. In his 
opinion, the organization's charter, namely the 1864 Treaty of Geneva, took 
cognizance only "of the sick and wounded of armies in time ofwar." 15 Therefore 
the American Red Cross would not contribute money unless Summers assured him 
that it would go directly to the Serbian government. It was then up to Pasic and 
the Serbian Red Cross to apply aid where "it would seem ... the most expedient."1r' 
Over the next few weeks, Summers would experience even more problems 
with the American Red Cross. For some time Davis refused to recognize or 
provide for a group of American post-graduate surgeons who had come to Serbia 
from Berlin. 17 These men were skilled volunteers, and desirous of new and 
sanitary equipment, they unsuccessfully appealed to Davis. The reason given was 
that as an "invariable rule" the American Red Cross did not extend recognition to 
surgeons who "were not specifically retained or employed" by the organization 
15George W. Davis, Washington, D.C., 16 December 1912, M-357. As to the Red Cross 
charter, see American National Red Cross, History of the Red Cross: the Treaty <~{Geneva, and 
its Adoption by the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883). 
16lbid. 
17The four surgeons included: H.A. Rosenkranz (University of Chicago), Edgar L. 
Gilcreest (Johns Hopkins University), Theodore H. Wenning (Johns Hopkins University), 
William V. Boyle (Indiana School of Medicine, Indianapolis). An American bacteriologist 
named Benjamin Jablons (Cornell Medical College) also was present. 
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itself 18 To Summers, the Red Cross was making a terrible mistake, and he saw no 
reason why these men should not be afforded the necessary aid. Besides, Serbia 
was in dire need of surgeons, and it had been difficult enough to recruit and station 
the four he did have. Three other volunteers had left in less than a week, due 
mostly to what Summers called a "lack of grit."19 
The need for medical assistance became all the more urgent with the failure 
of a winter armistice on 23 January 1913. Prior to that time, the Ottomans had 
agreed to relinquish all of their territory west of Enez (Enos) and Midye (Midia), 
virtually the whole of European Turkey. Negotiations ended, however, when a 
Young Turk revolt overthrew the Turkish government, and by February 1913, war 
had resumed on all fronts. According to Summers, the problem was not only that 
there were more wounded, but that a majority of Red Cross units had gone home 
when the armistice was declared. Therefore the four American surgeons were 
more valuable than ever, and as a consequence, each was given command of his 
own field hospital. But, wrote Summers, they lacked "uniforms, operating clothes, 
18Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 April 1913, M-357. 
19Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 12 April 1913, M-357. According to 
Summers, the three who left lacked a "willingness to undergo, as others have done, some 
inconvenience to relieve human suffering." Contrary to his opinion, it appears that the surgeons 
were afraid that they would be infected with cholera. 
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some instruments, bed linen, oil clothes, a change oflinen for the wounded, 
interpreters, nurses, and in short, almost everything that a well organized unit 
should have .... "20 
At length Davis recognized the group, though he did so only two days before 
the conclusion of a second armistice. Final peace negotiations opened on 20 May, and 
ten days later the war officially ended with the Treaty of London. The victors soon 
began to squabble over the division of Macedonia; the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks each 
claiming territory the others wished to possess. Before the Russians could mediate a 
peaceful settlement, the Bulgarian general staff decided that it would be better to 
strengthen its position through war. On 29 June, the Bulgarians attacked both the 
Serbian and Greek lines, thus initiating a second Balkan conflict.21 
In short, the war was a disaster for Bulgaria. Already outnumbered by the 
Serbs and Greeks, within ten days Bulgaria had to face the additional armies of 
Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey. Nevertheless, its battles for Macedonia were 
among the bloodiest of both wars, and for a brief time the Bulgars were in 
210n the advent of the Second Balkan War, see Savo Skoko, Dmgi Balkanski rat 1913. 
godine (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski Institut, 1968). As to Austria's role in the conflict, see 
Margareta Faissler, "Austria-Hungary and the Disruption of the Balkan League," Slavic and East 
European Review XIX (1939): 141-157. 
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occupation of Serb territory. On 8 July, Summers reported that the Bulgarians had 
taken the Serbian town of Knjazevac, in the process committing a number of 
"cruelties" towards the Serbian wounded. 22 "Some of the men had their ears cut 
off," wrote Summers, "some were burned alive, and the flesh [was] cut from 
others. "23 In contrast, the consul recorded that the Bulgarian prisoners were "well 
treated by the Servians," and that the king himself visited those who were 
imprisoned in Belgrade.2"~ 
Summers's report was quite similar to that of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, an organization which sponsored a fact-finding mission to the 
Balkans in mid-1913. Included in this mission was an American named Samuel T. 
Dutton, a renowned professor of education at Columbia University.25 According to 
22Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 15 July 1913, M-357. 
24Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 8 July 1913, M-357. 
251n addition to Dutton, the mission included three noted personalities, the most 
prominent being Pavel Miliukov, who would later become an important member of Russia's 
Provisional Government. The other two men were M. Justin Godart, a French lawyer and 
politician; and Henry N. Brailsford, a British author and journalist. It is interesting to note that 
the Serbian government refused to recognize or aid the mission due to Miliukov's anti-Serb 
opinions. 
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one of Dutton's sources, the Bulgarian attack on Knjaievac was "not a case of mere 
pillage ... [it was] something worse; something stupefying."26 
In its final report the mission detailed instances of the "really savage and 
barbarous side of the second war," complete with mutilations, disembowelings, 
and beheadings.27 Perhaps the most striking example concerned a Serbian soldier 
who was captured, then "put on a spit and grilled."28 This is not to say that the 
report was entirely favorable to the Serbs. In fact, Consul Pupin felt that it was the 
result of "an Austrian intrigue," and that accounts damaging to the Serbs were 
intended to "blacken the Servian name throughout the civilized world. "29 
Whatever the case, the report did state that Serbia experienced far more 
casualties in its war with Bulgaria than it had in the preceding war with Turkey. 
Indeed, Summers could attest to the enormous influx of sick and wounded soldiers, 
a great many of whom were dying for lack of attention. The situation appeared so 
bleak that Summers began to organize teams of Serbian-Americans to assist the 
26Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Other Balkan Wars: 191./ Carnegie 
Endowment Report of the International Commission into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars, with a Forward by George F. Kennan (Washington, D.C.: Jarboe Printing Co., Inc., 1993), 
137. 
27Ibid, 142. 
28Ibid, 142. 
29New York Times, 29 June 1914. 
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doctors already present in Belgrade. He also contacted the New York Herald of 
Paris in hopes that the newspaper would call for the support of doctors throughout 
Europe. 
The appeal caught the attention of Lafayette Young, a fonner U. S. senator 
from Iowa who was vacationing in Karlsbad.30 A well-known philanthropist, 
Young infonned Summers that he was coming to Belgrade, and that he wanted to 
help in any way possible. Upon his arrival, both Summers and Young travelled to 
the front-line hospitals at Nis. There they recorded that operations were perfonned 
without anesthetics, though in nearby rooms the wounded were "calmly and 
stoically awaiting their tum."31 They met briefly with each of the surgeons, and 
after distributing supplies, cigarettes, and other equipment, they boarded a return 
train to Belgrade. "As we passed through the country," wrote Summers, 
"everywhere suffering and distress [could be seen]. Only about half the land is 
cultivated, and even the com fields are full of weeds .... The outside world, I am 
afraid, will have to render assistance this fall. "32 
30The editor of the Des Moines Capital, Young was for many years prominent in Iowa 
politics. 
31 Summers to Secretary of State, Belgrade, 24 July 1913, M-357. 
32lbid. Besides appealing to the Red Cross, the Serbian government also attempted to 
repopulate Macedonia with Serbs from the United States. See Milenko Karanovich, "Causes of 
Serbian Immigration to the United States," Balkan Studies 31 ( 1990): 156. It is unclear as to how 
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Neither Summers nor Jackson remained at his post long enough to oversee 
the procurement of such aid. The Second Balkan War ended on I 0 August 1913, 
and within three months both men received new commissions for posts outside of 
Serbia. The country they left was destitute and penniless, though by the terms of 
the Treaty of Bucharest, it received the provinces ofVardar Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Metohija, and shared with Montenegro the Sanjak of Novi Pazaar. Its territory and 
population nearly doubled, and by June 1914, Serbia was able to put some 200,000 
men in the field, backed by an equal number of reserves.D As a result of the two 
Balkan Wars, Serbia became a true military power, a fact which contributed greatly 
to the outbreak of World War I. 
many returned, though it appears the Balkan Wars forced many more Serbs to immigrate to 
America. According to one author, a number of Serb veterans were among the striking miners 
caught in Colorado's famous "Ludlow Massacre" of early 1914. See George J. Prpic, South 
Slavic Immigration in America (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978). 
33Serbia increased its territory from an estimated 43,800 sq. km. to 87,300 sq. km., while 
its population rose from 2,912,000 to 4,444,000. See Petrovich, vol. II, 603. 
V. Epilogue, 1914 
In the wake of the Second Balkan War, Jackson's replacement was Charles 
J. Vopicka, a Czech immigrant and businessman from Chicago, Illinois. Although 
appointed as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on 11 September 
1913, Vopicka did not arrive in Belgrade until January of the following year. 
When the minister at last received an audience with Peter, he reported that there 
was "much joy among the Serbians, being Slavs, that the United States had 
selected a born Slav as her representative. "1 He found Peter "a man of very 
distinguished appearance," although "his health was poor and he was then quite 
seventy years old."2 The king entertained Vopicka for more than an hour, and after 
parting gestures the minister left Belgrade for Sofia. 
Vopicka remained in Bulgaria through the spring of 1914, though on one 
occasion he had reason to confer with Pasic. It seems he needed the prime 
1Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921), 22. 
2Ibid, 69. A year earlier Jackson made the same observation, stating that "His Majesty 
was suffering so badly from rheumatism that he was almost unable to walk." Jackson to 
Secretary of State, Bucharest, l April 1913, M-357. 
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minister's help in obtaining some confiscated American property, namely a case of 
Iver Johnson shotguns seized by Serbian customs at the outbreak of First Balkan 
War. The owner of the guns was an American citizen named Frederick Peters, 
owner of an import/export firm in Hamburg, Germany, who had sent the case 
directly to a buyer in Salonika.3 At length Vopicka secured its release, appealing 
directly to Pasic in late 1913. 4 
On 12 July 1914, Vopicka returned to Belgrade to attend festivities in honor 
of the king's birthday. Instead of mirth and revelry, he found the city subdued, its 
public buildings draped in ceremonial black. The cause of this was the death of 
Russia's chief representative to Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig, an ardent supporter of 
Serbia and a close friend of its prime minister, Nikola Pasic. Though the Austrian 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been murdered just two weeks earlier, Peter's 
Russophile court mourned only for Hartwig. 5 
3Peters to Secretary of State, Hamburg, l 0 November 1913, M-357. Salonika was at that 
point controlled by the Ottoman Empire, but by the end of the war it was an acknowledged 
possession of Greece. 
4Vopicka to Secretary of State, Sofia, 29 December 1913, M-357. 
5The assassination of the archduke is ably discussed by Vladimir Dedijer, The Road lo 
Sarajevo (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966). See also David MacKenzie, Violent Solutions: 
Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918 (New York: University Press of 
America, 1996), 232-59. 
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According to Vopicka, the funeral was a grand affair, and though there were 
sworn depositions to the contrary, "ugly rumors were then afloat that Hartwig met 
death at the hands of the Austrian minister."6 Whatever the case, by July 1914 
Austro-Serbian relations were utterly irredeemable. The murder of the archduke, 
believed to have been masterminded in Belgrade, elicited a stem ultimatum from 
Vienna. Among other things, Austria demanded that Serbia suppress all anti-
Habsburg activity within its borders. 7 It also insisted that Austrian officials take 
part in the investigation, a clear violation of Serbian sovereignty. Therefore on 25 
July Belgrade agreed to virtually all of Vienna's terms, but openly rejected the 
presence of Austrian officials on Serbian soil. 
To Vopicka this was of little importance. "It seems that Austria wanted war 
with Serbia," he wrote, and that regardless of Serbian reparations, the death of the 
archduke "was welcomed as a casus belli."8 Nonetheless, in a private meeting with 
Pasic, Vopicka advised the prime minister that he should avoid war at all costs, 
6Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, 28. 
7For a general overview and translation of the ultimatum, see Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The 
Origins of the World War, 2d ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1939). See also L.C. F. Turner, 
Origins of the First World War(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), Barbara 
Jelavich, The Habsurg Empire in European Affairs, 181./-1918 and Alfred Francis Pibram, 
Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918. 
8Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, 31. 
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especially when his country "was in no position to engage in fresh hostilities. "9 
Pasic's response, however vague, was that he would "do everything he honorabZv 
could to avoid war." 10 This, however, did not mean an outright acceptance of the 
Austrian ultimatum. By 25 July 1914, Vopicka was in Bucharest, arriving aboard 
"the last steamer that left Belgrade before the World War began. "11 
9lbid., 30. 
10Jbid. 
11 Ibid. 
VI. Conclusion 
The outbreak ofWorld War I, initiated by Austria in July 1914, brought a 
promising decade of Serbo-American relations to a close. In fact, Charles Vopicka 
was America's last official representative to Serbia, which in late 191 8 became part 
of a triune kingdom encompassing both Croatia and Slovenia. From this point 
forward American representatives would be accredited to the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later known as Yugoslavia. As this country soon took 
on a unique, geo-political importance, its ties with the United States increased 
manyfold. 
Thus Serbia's post-war relations with America stood in sharp contrast to 
those of 1903-13, when even President Theodore Roosevelt disparaged of contact 
with Belgrade. Whatever the case, at the beginning of this period Serbia had little 
time (or reason) to ponder the opinions of the United States. The country had just 
been rocked by a palace coup, and its new king, Peter I Karadjordjevic, was in dire 
need of foreign recognition, particularly from those governments that were of more 
immediate importance to Serbia than was the United States. Therefore by August 
1903, Peter had sent letters of introduction to each of the European heads of state, 
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though "either due to forgetfulness or economy," wrote the American minister John 
B. Jackson, "no [such] telegram was sent to the President.. .. "12 
One should not infer, however, that Serbia was disinterested in relations 
with the United States. On the contrary, Belgrade was acutely aware of America's 
expanding influence, especially in commerce, an area in which Serbia had long 
been dependent upon Austria-Hungary. If it indeed was to emancipate its own 
market, Serbia would have to increase its commercial links with countries outside 
of Central Europe, namely Russia, France, Great Britain, and if possible, the 
United States. To this end Belgrade concluded a number of commercial 
agreements, and in May 1904, Peter informed Jackson that he would "neglect 
nothing which may realize or facilitate a closer rapprochement between our two 
countries. "13 
Whether or not this "rapprochement" meant closer economic ties is open to 
debate, but what is certain is that by 1 908, Serbian exports began to enter the 
American market en masse. That year the United States received over 1.3 million 
kg of Serbian fruit and copper. Though only 2. 7 percent of Serbia's total export, 
the number would reach a high of 4.6 percent (2. 7 million kg) in 1912. During this 
12Jackson to Hay, Sinaia, 6 August 1903, T-630. 
13Jackson to Hay, Athens, 14 May, 1904, T-630. 
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period there was also a marked increase in imports from the United States. 
Starting at just under 1 million kg in 1903, these imports peaked at 2.1 million kg 
in 1911. Though a majority were of a colonial nature ( ie. petroleum, coffee, and 
tobacco), Serbia did manage to purchase a reasonable quantity of American 
machinery. Such striking growth, however, was not due to a greater stateside 
awareness of Serbia. It was, rather, the logical outcome of the Austro-Serbian 
tariff, or "Pig War" of 1906. 
Instigated by Austria, the ill-fated "Pig War" was an attempt at pressuring 
the Serbs into economic and political servitude though the use of commercial 
sanctions. During its first full year the "Pig War" achieved the desired effect: 
Serbia's economy, heretofore dependent upon the Dual Monarchy for a majority of 
its trade, suffered a loss of over 40 million dinars. Within twelve months, 
however, the Serbs managed to acquire alternate commercial outlets, the most 
important being Turkish-held Salonika. Thus by 1907 Serbia was well on its way 
to economic recovery, demonstrated by an almost 20 percent increase in total 
commerce. Over the next five years, trade with the United States experienced a 
similar boom, lasting almost until the outbreak of the First Balkan War. 
As for political affairs, beginning in 1906 there was a noticeable increase in 
diplomatic contact between Serbia and the United States. In June of that year the 
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State Department appointed, for the first time ever, a resident consul-general in 
Belgrade. It appears that the new post was created so that the United States could 
capitalize on the Austro-Serbian "Pig War" of 1906. The consul-general was 
expected, among other things, to alert American firms of new opportunities in the 
region. Therefore by 1907, at least three American companies were interested in 
Serbia, described optimistically as "a great new field, rich in trade possibilitics."1-l 
Prior to 1906, the State Department had used only vice consuls-general in 
Belgrade, though a majority of these men were from countries other than the 
United States. From 1903 to 1913, only two of the six men named to the post were 
American citizens. One such consul was of Swiss descent; another a Hungarian 
Jew who had immigrated to New York. 
In addition to the Belgrade consulate, America maintained a representative 
of higher rank, a chief of mission known titularly as "envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary." These envoys were solely responsible for diplomatic 
contact between Serbia and the United States, often concluding treaties, appearing 
at royal functions, and exchanging notes between heads of state. In the decade 
preceding World War I, seven men were named to the post, a position requiring an 
appointment by the President himself. 
1 ~Mooreto Loomis, Sinaia, 22 August 1905, T-513. 
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Apart from Serbia, the envoyship also included the courts of Greece and 
Romania. This left American ministers to the region in a unique position, 
especially in times of crisis, for they could leave their countries without a break in 
diplomatic ties. In 1903 for instance, Minister John B. Jackson left Belgrade in the 
wake of a palace coup. Other ministers would do so during the Bosnian 
annexation crisis of 1908-09, and during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Besides 
personal safety, these men abstained from Belgrade for political reasons, often 
instructed to reside elsewhere so as to dispel any "active [American] interest in the 
situation[ s]. "15 
So what then was America's stake in Serbia, and why did it insist upon 
relations with a country so devoid of economic and political influence? The 
answer seems to rest in America's new found position as a great power. Fresh 
from a war with Spain, in 1903 the United States was under the leadership of 
Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, inimical nationalist who yearned for expansion. 
His push for new markets insured that American envoys could be found in such 
backwater places as Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest. Though some were 
aggressive entrepeneurs, trade between the two countries was small and remained 
so throughout the pre-war period. America's economic focus therefore was not on 
15Root to Knowles, Washington, D.C., 7 October 1908, M-862. 
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Eastern Europe or the Balkans. On the contrary, American traders favored South 
and Central America, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, all areas more 
profitable than Serbia. Political relations from 1903 to 1913 were even less 
pronounced, owing in great measure to America's traditional non-involvement in 
European affairs. Serbia was simply too remote, too controversial, and the center 
of an ongoing rivalry which soon led Europe to war. 
name 
John B. Jackson 
John W Riddle 
Horace G. Knowles 
Huntington Wilson 
Spencer F. Eddy 
John R. Carter 
John B. Jackson 
Charles J. Vopicka 
Appendix A 
U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Serbia, 
1903-1913 
res. date apptd. pres. of cred. 
NJ 13 Oct. 1902 9 May 1904 
MN 8 March 1905 7 Mav 1906 
DE 16 Jan. 1907 I July 1907 
IL 17 Dec. 1908 
IL 11 Jan. 1909 
MD 25 Sept. 1909 3 May 1910 
NJ 12 Aug. 1911 16Jan. 1912 
IL 11 Sept. 1913 15 Dec. 1913 
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term. of mission 
13 July 1905 
23 Jan. 1907 
4 Feb. 1909 
27 Oct. 1911 
15 Oct. 1913 
17 Dec. 1918 
Source: Department of State. Principal Otficers of the Department <~{State and United States Chief<; of 
Mission. 1778-1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Go\'emment Printing Office. 1991, pp. 164-66. 
name 
Max\VellK.. Moorhead 
Robert S.S. Bergh 
Maddin Summers 
Lewis W. Haskell 
AppendixB 
U.S. Consuls-General to Bel2rade, 
1906-1913* 
res. date appt'd 
PA 22 June 1906 
ND 14 Dec 1908 
TN 20 Dec. 1911 
SC 24 Nov. 1913 
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term. of mission 
31 March 1908 
29 Feb 1912 
31 Dec. 1913 
1 7 Sept. 191 S 
Notes: (*)The United States did not appoint a resident consul-general until mid-1906. 
Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587. 
name 
Christian Vogeli 
Voislav Petrovic 
Samuel Weiss 
R. Novakovic 
Harry B. Richardson 
E. Jevremovic 
Appendix C 
U.S. Vice Consuls-General to Belgrade, 
1903-1913. 
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res. date appt'd term. of mission 
Serbia I 0 March 1900 I June 1908 
Serbia I April 1908 April 1909 
NY 16Julyl909 unknown 
Serbia 6 March 1911 unknown 
PA 7Feb.1913 31May1913 
Serbia 16 Sept. 1913 5Feb.1915 
Source: List of U.S. Consular Officers, 1789-1939, National Archives, Microcopy No.T-587. 
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